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UALR LAW REVIEW
WILEY AUSTIN BRANTON AND THE VOTING RIGHTS STRUGGLE
Judith Kilpatrick*
1. INTRODUCTION
Less than fifty years ago, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 was enacted.
It was a landmark achievement for African-Americans in their struggle to
regain voting and other constitutional rights taken from those residing in the
former Confederate states between 1890 and 1910 when the states revised
their constitutions and enacted other laws to discriminate against Black vot-
ers. 1 The barriers established to prevent southern Blacks from exercising
their civil rights were strong and varied. In many states, the right to vote
was denied outright or was subject to myriad regulations and requirements
that prevented even educated Blacks from registering successfully. 2 Eco-
nomic intimidation and physical violence kept many Blacks from making an
* Associate Professor, University of Arkansas School of Law; J.S.D. 1999, LL.M.
1992, Columbia University, J.D. 1975, B.A. 1971, University of California-Berkeley. The
author would like to thank the Branton family-brothers Leo and Sterling, sister Julia Bran-
ton Jones, children Richard Branton and wife Kitty, Wylene Branton Wood and husband
Cliff, Wiley Branton, Jr. and wife Stephanie, Beverly Branton Lamberson, and Debra Bran-
ton-for its cooperation in allowing the use of Wiley Branton's papers and giving of their
personal time in tracing his career. The University of Arkansas School of Law has supported
the work with summer research grants in 2001 and 2002, and with the research assistance of
students Tiffany Armstrong and Rhonda Williams-Henry (UA Law 2002), Peggy S. Lloyd
and Kristen Thompson (UA History 2002, 2003), Johnnie Lee Miller (UA Law 2004), and
Ashley Ragsdale (UA Law 2005). Thanks are due to Jacquelyn Fifer of the law school staff,
who spent many hours transcribing tapes, and librarian Sally J. Kelley, who performed the
initial Internet searching. Additional appreciation to my friend Julie McDonald, whose cri-
tique of a prior draft set me on a better path. As with prior work in this area, special thanks to
Elizabeth Motherwell, who started me in this research direction. This article will be adapted
for inclusion in a biography of Mr. Branton.
1. See generally STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS, VOTING RIGHTS IN THE SOUTH,
1944-1969, Ch. 1 (1976). The 1965 Act focused on Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and
West Virginia. For Arkansas actions, see Judith Kilpatrick, (Extra)Ordinary Men: African-
American Lawyers and Civil Rights in Arkansas Before 1950, 53 ARK. L. REV. 299, 354-56
(2000).
2. The existence of the "poll tax" in most Southern states kept the poor of both races
from registering to vote. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 55-56. Assuming the potential voter was
able to pay the poll tax, literacy tests also were the law. Administered unfairly, they kept the
number of Black voters low. Id. at 87-88 (reporting on one college graduate who failed the




effort to register, even where it was technically allowed.3 The federal gov-
ernment provided little help. Progress toward improved conditions was
slow. Thousands of ordinary people, most of them Black, labored, fought,
and suffered violence and death to gain the unfettered right to vote.
Many of those most involved in this effort have since died. The stories
of the most well-known personalities, Roy Wilkins, Whitney Young, and
Martin Luther King, Jr., have been related by the men themselves or told in
biographies by others.4 These men were not the entire story, however. If
they might be likened to the generals in a war, then there were hundreds of
lieutenants who worked behind the headlines.
Wiley Austin Branton was unique in this second group. Although he
worked among the acknowledged African-American leaders and was re-
spected by them, he was never really one of them. He established a long-
term working relationship with the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People (NAACP), 6 but he was not "its man." This inde-
pendence let him avoid the rivalries among the Black organizations, yet
provide the intermediation that allowed the national groups to work together
for a critical period of time in the early 1960s. Wiley Branton reached em-
ployment heights shared by few other African-Americans, yet he never lost
the sense that service in a cause was its own reward. 7
3. Id. at 97-98.
4. See, e.g., RoY WILKINS & TOM MATHEWS, STANDING FAST: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY
OF RoY WILKINS (1982) (telling of his work with the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People, the oldest existing civil rights group); TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING
THE WATERS: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1954-63 (1988) (relating the history of Martin
Luther King, Jr. and his Southern Christian Leadership Conference) [hereinafter BRANCH 1];
TAYLOR BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: AMERICA IN THE KING YEARS, 1963-65 (1998) (relating
the history of Martin Luther King, Jr. and his Southern Christian Leadership Conference)
[hereinafter BRANCH 2]; NANCY J. WEISS, WHITNEY M. YOUNG, JR. AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS (1989) (focusing on the National Urban League); JOHN LEWIS & MICHAEL
D'ORSO, WALKING WITH THE WIND: A MEMOIR OF THE MOVEMENT (1998) (describing his
experiences with the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee); AUGUST MEIER &
ELLIOTT RUDWICK, CORE: A STUDY IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT, 1942-1968 (1973)
(relating the history of revitalization by James Farmer of the Congress of Racial Equality).
5. See, e.g., ANDREW YOUNG, AN EASY BURDEN (1996) (relating his work with the
Southern Christian Leadership Council and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr.).
6. Document regarding the NAACP Involvement of Wiley A. Branton (undated) (on
file with author) (stating that he had joined the organization while a teenager and become a
life member while living in Washington, D.C., with continuous activities with the group in
between).
7. Branton had role models for public service. His grandfather, J.A. Wiley, was a char-
ter member of the Pine Bluff Chapter of the NAACP, begun in 1918, and appeared regularly
in the records as a continuing member thereafter. Application for Charter of Pine Bluff, Ark.,
Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (Nov. 28, 1919),
in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part I, G13, Branch Files, Pine Bluff, 1917-1922, at 4 (on file
with the Library of Congress); Membership Report (June 14, 1930), in PAPERS OF THE
NAACP, Part I, G13, Branch Files, Pine Bluff, 1928-1930 (on file with the Library of Con-
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Branton believed strongly in the value of the vote as a vehicle for self-
determination and equality for his race. He had good reason for this belief.
Branton was born in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, a part of the segregated South, in
1923. As he grew up, he was barred from attending the same schools as the
white children with whom he played in his integrated neighborhood.8 He
and his family could not eat in white-owned restaurants. 9 When Branton
went to the movies, he was required to sit in a segregated balcony.10 When
he began college, he could not attend the University of Arkansas." In 1943,
at the age of 20, Branton joined the Army to serve his country in the battles
of World War 11.12 Even at war, there was segregation.13 These and other
restrictions were mandated by state and federal laws enacted by white offi-
cials and legislators who had been elected by the voting public. Branton
knew that if Blacks were allowed to vote without hindrance, they could
wield significant power.
gress); Letter from W.B. Leloman, President, Ark. State Federation of Colored Women's
Clubs, to NAACP (Jan. 10, 1935), in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part I, G13, Branch Files, Pine
Bluff, 1935-1936 (on file with the Library of Congress); Letter from A.M. Parker, Secretary
Ark. State Federation of Colored Women's Clubs, to Mr. White (Jan. 22, 1938), in PAPERS
OF THE NAACP, Part I, G13, Branch Files, Pine Bluff, 1937-39 (on file with the Library of
Congress).
Later, Wiley Branton's grandmother, Effa Stuart Wiley, served on the Executive
Committee of the Women's Auxiliary. Letter from J.J. Black, Branch Secretary, to Miss
Dora L. Alston, NAACP (May 12, 1928), in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part I, G13, Branch
Files, Pine Bluff, 1924-1928 (on file with the Library of Congress). In 1930 Wiley Branton's
Aunt Julia and Uncle Joe Wiley became members. See Membership Report, supra, at 1929-
1930. His mother, Pauline W. Branton, and Uncle Frank Wiley joined in 1937. See Member-
ship Report, supra, at 1937-1939 (on file with the Library of Congress).
8. Wiley A. Branton, Post-War Race Relations in Pine Bluff, in LEGAL PAPERS OF
WILEY A. BRANTON, at 4 (on file with author) [hereinafter WAB Pine Bluff Essay]. This was
still the case after World War II and would not begin to change until after the United States
Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
9. WAB Pine Bluff Essay, supra note 8, at 7-8.
10. Kenneth L. Adelman, "You Can Change Their Hearts," THE WASHINGTONIAN, Mar.
1988, at 107, 109; WAB Pine Bluff Essay, supra note 8, at 8 (noting that some theatres re-
fused to admit Blacks at all). Even the drive-in theatre was no exception. At first, Blacks
were not admitted at all. Later, they were admitted but could not use the restrooms. When
some White patrons complained about seeing Blacks seated in cars next to them, Blacks
were again prohibited from attending. Id. at 9.
11. Guerdon D. Nichols, Breaking the Color Barrier at the University of Arkansas, 27
ARK. HIST. Q. 3, 15 (1968) (stating that the university was integrated on February 2, 1948);
see infra note 25, regarding Branton's involvement with that event.
12. Enlisted Record and Report of Separation Honorable Discharge, National Archives
and Records Administration, National Personnel Records Center, St. Louis, Missouri (on file
with author).
13. Adelman, supra note 10, at 110.
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In 1940 it was estimated that only five percent of Blacks were able to
vote in the eleven states of the former Confederacy. 14 In 1944, while Bran-
ton was still in military service, the United States Supreme Court decided
the case of Smith v. Allwright,15 which culminated years of lawsuits by the
NAACP for voting rights.'
6
In Allwright, the Supreme Court held that the selection of Democratic
candidates in the state of Texas involved application of state law and vio-
lated the constitutional rights of Blacks who were not allowed to participate
in the Democratic Party.' 7 If party primaries were not treated as part of the
states' governing process, subject to constitutional and federal franchise
law, then thousands of eligible voters barred from party membership were
effectively denied the franchise.' 8 This decision reversed the court's prior
position, which had held that political parties were private associations that
could not be forced to admit Blacks.' 9
The Al/wright decision opened the door but it did not immediately dis-
solve decades of discrimination that kept Blacks from voting. Southern
states and local political organizations immediately acted to subvert, avoid,
or defy the Court's decision.20 In Arkansas, for example, where the Democ-
rats exerted authority over primaries in the same manner as in Texas, imme-
diate reactions of white political figures were negative.2'
14. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 22.
15. 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
16. See, e.g., Nixon v. Hemdon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932); see also QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH: THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT,
1965-1990, at 22 (Chandler Davidson & Bemad Grofinan, eds. 1994) (noting that the
NAACP was "the main organization through which the laws preventing black voting were
attacked").
17. 321 U.S. at 664-65. The Court was convinced by evidence demonstrating that selec-
tion of Democratic candidates in the state of Texas primary was controlled by state law, even
though performed by a private association, and thus was state action. Id.
18. Id. at 663-64.
19. Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935).
20. See, e.g., LAWSON, supra note 1, at 49.
21. C. Calvin Smith, The Politics of Evasion: Arkansas'Reaction to Smith v. Allwright,
1944, 67 J. NEGRO HIST. 40, 45 (1982). In addition to rhetorical challenges, the State Democ-
ratic Committee appointed a committee of lawyers to study the decision and recommend
methods for evading compliance. Id. at 46. The first effort was to require a loyalty oath that
eliminated anyone who had ever voted for Republican candidates in past elections. Id. A
second ploy was to allow nonmembers to vote in Democratic primaries but continue to deny
them membership in the party and, thus, any participation in the selection of party candi-
dates. Id. at 47. A third action required nonmembers to "agree to support the principles and
laws outlined in the 1874 Arkansas Constitution," which instituted segregation within the
state. Id. Two bills were promulgated in the state legislature that would continue the pre-
Allwright status quo by other means. Id. at 48. Passage of these measures led to multiple pre-
election elections and such electoral chaos that a newspaper editorial stated "if Negroes are




When Wiley Branton returned to Pine Bluff after his military discharge
in 1946, he had been politicized by the experience.22 He was determined to
work for change in the South. Branton immediately joined the local
NAACP branch and became involved with voting and other civil rights ef-
forts.23 This led to his participation in a voter registration drive that resulted
in Branton's arrest for violating a state statute that prohibited the use of
sample ballots to teach people how to vote.24 This first effort to expand vot-
ing rights as an ordinary citizen is described in Part I.
During this same period, Branton participated in successful action to
integrate the University of Arkansas through the admission of his friend,
Silas Hunt, another war veteran, to the University's School of Law in
1948.25 These and other experiences resulted in Branton's decision to be-
come a lawyer himself. In 1953, Branton became the third Black graduate
of the University's law school.26
Wiley Branton became a lawyer when civil rights efforts were becom-
ing front-page news across the country. Segregation limited his law prac-
22. Adelman, supra note 10, at 110. This was a common reaction at the time. In Arkan-
sas, there were at least two organizations created by Black soldiers following the war-the
Veterans Good Government Association in Little Rock, JOHN A. KIRK, REDEFINING THE
COLOR LINE, BLACK ACTIVISM IN LITTLE ROCK, ARKANSAS, 1940-1970, 31 (2002), and the
Veterans and Citizens League for Better Government in Pine Bluff. Democrat Vote Stuns
Arkansas, CHIC. DEFENDER, Nov. 29, 1947 (noting that all but one of the candidates sup-
ported by this group won office).
23. Interview of Wiley Austin Branton with Steven Lawson, 51, Oral History Research
Office, Eisenhower Library, Columbia University (October 1970) (on file with author) [here-
inafter WAB 1970 Interview].
24. Sec. 20 of Act 123 of 1935, codified as Sec. 4873, Ch. 55, Pope's Digest, Vol. 1,
Statutes of Ark. 1393 modified as Ark. Code Ann. § 7-1-103(17).
25. Interview by William A. Elwood with Wiley A. Branton, The Civil Rights Lawyers
Documentary Project, University of Virginia 103-04 (July 15, 1987) (on file with author)
[hereinafter WAB 1987 Interview]. Branton stated that the action was taken when Governor
Ben Laney put pressure on Arkansas AM&N College, the state's Black institution of higher
education, to begin offering graduate degrees. Id. The pressure was an effort to provide
graduate education for Blacks that would avoid integration of the University of Arkansas. Id.
At a meeting Laney attended, Branton stated that he would register for a degree in business
administration at the university and would sue if he were not admitted. Id.
Publicity about Branton's declaration pushed the university into announcing a plan
for integration that would begin with graduate schools in February 1948. To test the plan,
Branton talked his AM&N classmate, Silas Hunt, into going with him to attempt registration.
Branton would try first to register in the undergraduate college. If he was denied, then Hunt
would apply to the law school. If both were denied, Branton would sue for admission and
Hunt would go on to the University of Indiana where he had already been admitted to the
school of law. A suit wasn't necessary. Although Branton was denied admission, Hunt was
admitted. Id.
26. Id. at 102 (noting that he actually was admitted to the practice of law in 1952, by
virtue of a veteran's preference that allowed him to take the bar exam after accumulating a
certain number of law school credits).
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tice.27 He found his clientele almost exclusively from members of his race,
as had earlier Black lawyers. 28 When he traveled to other courts within Ar-
kansas, there were few hotels where he could find lodging.29 He was re-
quired to stay with friends or drive back to Pine Bluff each night, sometimes
hundreds of miles. 30 These limitations also helped, in a way. During the
next ten years, Wiley Branton was one of the few Black lawyers in the
South who represented clients on civil rights issues.31 This provided him
with opportunities to pursue that work on, first, a regional, then a national,
scale.
Despite these barriers, Branton's compassion and intelligence made
him a good lawyer,32 and his practice was a successful one. The year after
he opened his law office, in 1953, the NAACP asked him to serve as an
Assistant Special Prosecutor in the trial of a white man for the rape of a
seven-year-old Black girl, which resulted in conviction.33 Branton soon be-
27. In one of his earliest cases, described infra note 33 and accompanying text, the
judge asked the all-White jury panel whether they would be biased by the fact that the State
of Arkansas was being represented by a "colored lawyer." Wiley A. Branton, Speech ad-
dressed to American Association of Law Schools' program: Access 2000, The Challenge to
Assure Diversity in the Legal Profession 1 (Oct. 1988) (on file with author) [hereinafter
WAB Access 2000 Speech] (continuing "[a]nd then he reared back, and said 'of course, he's
a graduate of our own state university.' And then he hunched his shoulders and leaned for-
ward and said '[b]ut he's a Negro."').
28. Kilpatrick, supra note 1, at 309, 311.
29. WAB 1987 Interview, supra note 25, at 119; WAB Access 2000 Speech, supra note
27, at 10.
30. WAB 1987 Interview, supra note 25, at 119; WAB Access 2000 Speech, supra note
27, at 10.
31. In 1950 the U.S. Census showed 186 Black lawyers in the eleven former Confeder-
ate states. 1950 U.S. Census, Vol. II, Characteristics of the Population. In his book
EMANCIPATION, THE MAKING OF THE BLACK LAWYERS, 1844-1944, 634-36 (1993), J. Clay
Smith, Jr., included 1940 U.S. Census figures revealing only 156 Black lawyers in those
eleven states, so there had not been much change in ten years. In Arkansas and the two con-
tiguous states, there were only twenty lawyers when Branton began his practice. 1950 U.S.
Census, Vol. II, Characteristics of the Population, pp. 4-183, 18-204, and 24-180.
In 1961, when Thurgood Marshall asked Branton to go to Jackson, Mississippi, to
help the "freedom riders" of the Congress of Racial Equality, the numbers had not changed
significantly. Interview by James Mosby with Wiley A. Branton, The Civil Rights Documen-
tation Project, Moorland-Spingam Research Library, Howard University 29-30 (1969) (on
file with author) [hereinafter WAB 1969 Interview]. Only three of the four lawyers Branton
knew about would work on civil rights cases. Id. If we assume that some others in the group
of twenty also would not work on civil rights cases, then the picture looks even bleaker.
32. Eulogy for Wiley Austin Branton, Sr. by Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., 3-4 (Dec. 19, 1988)
(on file with author) (describing Branton's attitude toward his work).
33. Watt v. State, 222 Ark. 483, 261 S.W.2d 544 (1953). The Arkansas Conference of
NAACP Branches received the Thalheimer Award from the national NAACP for its conduct
in pursuing the matter. 1958 Branton Biography (resume), Exhibit 10, attachments to letter
from Wiley Austin Branton to Roy R. Russo, Cohn and Marks, Washington, D.C. (May 9,
1985) (on file with author).
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came involved in other cases that attracted attention within and without the
state.34 That a young lawyer, recently admitted to practice, would handle
cases of this import so quickly demonstrates the dearth of available counsel
for these matters. That he was successful is an indication of his legal prow-
ess.
Branton's most notable representation was the case of Cooper v.
Aaron.31 In February 195636 he sued the Little Rock School Board on behalf
of thirty-three Black high school students and their parents for the Board's
failure to implement a court-approved desegregation plan following the
United States Supreme Court's 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion.37 The U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Branton's case on
September 12, 1958, ordering the school board to implement its court-
approved integration plan immediately.38 Between the filing of the Little
Rock suit and its ultimate conclusion in favor of Branton's clients, local
politics and white resistance created a federal constitutional crisis that tested
the Brown decision and the authority of the federal government. 39 The re-
fusal of Arkansas Governor Orville Faubus to obey federal court orders
requiring Central High School to admit nine Black students forced President
Eisenhower to send the 101st Airborne Division to enforce the orders.4a
During that action the Black students were escorted to classes by armed
troops.
The Little Rock events, covered intensively by the national media,
gave Branton a national reputation, particularly within Black communities.4'
34. See infra notes 35-40 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Payne v. Arkansas, 226
Ark. 910, 295 S.W.2d 312 (1956) (successfully appealing another death sentence, having lost
at trial, to the United State Supreme Court, 56 U.S. 560, 7,8 S. Ct. 844 (1956); Wabbaseka
Sch. Dist. v. Johnson, 225 Ark. 982, 286 S.W.2d 841 (1956) (obtaining back pay and rein-
statement for a Black schoolteacher unfairly fired just before the school year began); Alford
v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 266 S.W.2d 804 (1954) (successfully appealing a death sentence
imposed after a trial in which two white lawyers represented the defendant)).
35. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
36. Little Rock: The Chronology of a Contrived Crisis, in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part
III, A98, Desegregation, Schools, Arkansas, Little Rock-Central High, 1956-1957, at 4 (on
file with the Library of Congress).
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
38. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 17. Thereafter, Governor Faubus closed the Little Rock public
schools, preventing any students from attending for the next two years. ROY REED, FAUBUS:
THE LIFE AND TIMES OF AN AMERICAN PRODIGAL 245, 255-56 (1997).
39. Cooper, 358 U.S. at 4. An excellent review of the events may be found in TONY
FREYER, THE LITTLE ROCK CRISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1984).
40. The troops were sent in on September 25, 1957, and remained until November 27,
when they were replaced by federalized Arkansas National Guardsmen. Cooper, 358 U.S. at
12. See LAWSON, supra note 1, at 204, for a general description of these events.
41. See, e.g., Judge Bars Stay on Segregation for Little Rock, N.Y. TIMES, June 24,
1958, at 1; Ask Court Act on Little Rock, N.Y. J. AM., June 26, 1958, at 1; Special Supreme
Court Little Rock Hearing Asked, CHIC. SUN-TIMES, June 27, 1958, at 2 (regarding Branton's
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Thus, Branton was well-known and respected in civil rights circles by the
time the Voter Education Project (VEP), a program to educate and register
Southern Black voters, was proposed in 1962. Part II of the article traces
Branton's work from 1962 to 1965, when he directed implementation of this
unique regional effort.
Branton's success with the VEP led him to Washington, D.C., when
Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey asked Branton to become Executive
Director of President Lyndon B. Johnson's Council for Civil Rights. Part III
focuses on Branton's tenure with the Council, where his civil rights efforts
expanded to include implementation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
Branton went from the President's Council to the United States De-
partment of Justice (DOJ) at the request of President Johnson. Part IV re-
views his work within the DOJ, when he again made voting rights his pri-
mary focus as he aided in the implementation and enforcement of the 1965
Voting Rights Act.
Branton's successful career continued after he left the Department of
Justice. He served as Executive Director of Washington, D.C.'s United
Planning Organization (an anti-poverty effort) from 1967 to 1969.42 He di-
rected the civil rights efforts of the Committee on Community and Social
Action for labor leader Walter E. Reuther's quixotic Alliance for Labor
Action during the years 1969 to 1971. Success followed Branton during
years of private practice in Washington, D.C., from 1971 to 1976.44 In 1976
he became Dean of Howard University's School of Law.45 He left that posi-
tion in 1982 to join the D.C. office of the mega-lawyer firm, Sidley & Aus-
tin.46 Wiley Austin Branton died in 1988.47
resort to the United States Supreme Court to vacate a District Court order granting the
School Board a two-and-one-half-year stay on its integration plan); Appeals Court Studies
Delay in Integration in Little Rock, ST. LouIs POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 4, 1958, at 1 (reporting
on the hearing in the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals on the same issue); and Little Rock Waits
New School Test, CHIC. AM., Sept. 1959 (explaining the State of Arkansas' efforts to create
new laws to delay full integration after schools were reopened). In 1959 Branton spoke about
the case in Wisconsin, Sounds Warning on Baiting of Minorities, THE MILWAUKEE J., Oct.
19, 1959, at Part 1, and in Louisiana. Branton Listed as Top Speaker, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE,
Sept. 6, 1959.
42. UPO "Most Challenging" to New Director, WASHINGTON AFRO-AMERICAN, Oct. 7,
1967, at 3.
43. Branton Joins New Labor Alliance, WASH. POST, July 15, 1969, at C3.
44. Letter from Wiley Austin Branton to West Publishing Company (Feb. 17, 1972) (on
file with author) (noting formal name change of new firm).
45. Letter from James E. Cheek, President, Howard University, to Wiley Austin Bran-
ton (Nov. 30, 1977) (on file with author).
46. The Profession; On the Move, THE LEGAL TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1985, at 3.
47. Susan Heller Anderson, Wiley Branton, Early Desegregation Lawyer, Dies, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 17, 1988, at Obituaries; Tribute to Howard University Law School Dean Wiley
Branton, 101st Cong., 1st sess. 4 (1989).
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Throughout his life Branton continued to speak about his experiences
and to urge African-Americans to participate in the election process and in
other areas of civic life.48 Despite the titles given to his various positions,
Branton was not the public focus in most of them. Rather, his personal and
lawyering skills were best suited to "getting the job done" without excessive
fanfare. His lack of any need to make headlines has resulted in his virtual
disappearance from historic accounts of the momentous events of the
1960s.49 This article is an effort to "set the record straight," as Branton
might have said, by telling the story of his work in the struggle to obtain
voting rights for Black Americans.5 °
To recapitulate, this article pulls together information about Wiley
Branton's voting rights work, which formed a general theme throughout his
career. Part I reviews his 1948 work as a nonlawyer in voter registration
efforts of the NAACP in Pine Bluff, Arkansas, after the United States Su-
preme Court's 1944 decision in Smith v. Al/wright. Part II follows his activi-
ties in creating and directing the largest voter registration effort in U.S. his-
tory, the Voter Education Project, during 1962-1965. Part III covers Bran-
ton's contribution, working under Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey in
1965, to the President's Council for Civil Rights, which began to coordinate
the U.S. Government's various civil rights efforts following enactment of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Finally, Part IV relates his involvement in
efforts to implement the 1965 Voting Rights Act as a Special Assistant to
Attorney Generals Nicholas deB. Katzenbach and Ramsey Clark during
1965-1967.
II. FIRST EFFORTS: THE 1948 VOTER REGISTRATION DRIVE, ARREST,
AND CONVICTION
Branton's belief in the power of the vote was not unique. That belief
was widespread. Throughout its history, the NAACP had spent a significant
amount of its energies on voter registration drives.51 President Harry S.
Truman's 1946 Commission on Civil Rights, charged with determining
48. See, e.g., Dorothy Gilliam, Look for a Way Around Reagan's Budget Cuts, WASH.
POST, May 2, 1981, at B 1 (including Branton statement that legal and voting rights should be
key concerns when budget cuts were made).
49. For example, he is barely mentioned in most of the books cited supra note 4.
50. Letter from Mrs. Wylene Branton Wood to author (Mar. 27, 2002) (on file with
author). Mrs. Wood recalled that "setting the record straight" was part of Branton's funda-
mental being. Id.
51. WILKINS & MATHEWS, supra note 4, at 109. As early as 1929, NAACP members
were applauding the power of the vote. In a speech to those attending the 22nd Annual Con-
vention of the NAACP (1929), which was broadcast live over radio, civil rights attorney
Clarence Darrow stated that "[t]he Negro does have the weapon which he can use if he will.
That is the vote .... Vote strictly to advance the interests of your race." Id.
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what was needed to make equality a reality for all citizens, cited voting
rights as an essential component for achieving basic civil rights for Black
citizens.52 Even President Eisenhower, not considered a particular friend to
integration, was quoted as stating "[w]e must work for the abolition of re-
strictions remaining anywhere on the basic American right to vote.,
53
A. Voter Registration Efforts in Arkansas, 1946-1952
In 1946, when Branton returned to Pine Bluff after his military service,
voting in Arkansas was theoretically available to Blacks, but the procedures
to do so were burdensome. First, as was the case in other southern states,
Arkansas had a poll tax, payment of which was required to cast a vote. That
requirement can be stated simply, but it was not simple in practice. A poten-
tial voter was required to pay the tax each year and to retain the payment
receipt for display before entering the voting booth at the next election,
which might be almost a year away.54 Even if one had the means to pay, and
managed to keep track of the poll tax receipt over the period between its
payment and election day, the choices of sharecroppers and farm laborers
frequently were subject to coercion from white landowners.55
The second procedural knot for unsophisticated voters was Arkansas's
ballot form. The paper ballot listed the names of all candidates for the vari-
ous offices under the title of that office. A voter was required to cross out
the names of all those for whom he or she was not voting, leaving the name
of their selected candidate untouched.56
Arkansas's procedures were not the worst then in existence for Blacks.
At least Blacks could vote. Wiley Branton was born and raised in a commu-
nity where his educated middle-class family had been able to vote without
hindrance. 7 His mother's family had been prominent residents of Pine Bluff
52. Id. at 200. The title of the Commission's report, "To Secure These Rights," would
reappear as part of President Lyndon Johnson's voting rights efforts, in which Branton was
involved.
53. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 144.
54. WAB Pine Bluff essay, supra note 8, at 20; see also Calvin R. Ledbetter, Jr., Arkan-
sas Amendment for Voter Registration Without Poll Tax Payment, 54 ARK. HIST. Q. 134, 138
(1995) (demonstrating that the situation had not changed by 1964).
55. WAB Access 2000 Speech, supra note 27, at 7 (noting that they would buy blocks
of receipts, hold those receipts until election day, then collect the workers and take them to
polling places after telling them how to vote). In some instances, as Branton put it, the em-
ployers would "just put 'em on a truck or bus and.., have them ... physically walk through
while somebody else marked the ballot." WAB 1987 Interview, supra note 25, at 101.
56. WAB 1987 Interview, supra note 25, at 101; WAB Access 2000 Speech, supra note
27, at 7.
57. WAB Pine Bluff essay, supra note 8, at 20. This was not unusual in the larger towns
of the South. A. Stephen Stephan, Changes in the Status of Negroes in Arkansas, 1948-50, 9
ARK. HIST. Q. 43, 43 (1950) (stating that ". . . the Negro in Arkansas apparently votes to a
2004]
652 UALR LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
for several generations.58 His father and paternal grandfather operated a
taxicab company established in 1915 that was the first of its kind in town
and was used by both Blacks and Whites.
59
Branton recognized his privileged status and quickly joined the efforts
of the local NAACP branch to educate and register other Blacks who did
not have his advantages.6 ° In the first elections after his return from the
Army, Branton worked both on increasing Black voter registration and
electing White mayoral candidate George Steed, having been impressed by
Steed's "plea for 'good government.' ' 61 Wiley Branton believed that Blacks
and Whites should work together for the good of the community.
62
higher degree in cities than in rural areas, being most active politically in Little Rock and
Pine Bluff."). In cities and towns, blacks often had no trouble either registering or voting.
VERNON E. JORDAN, JR. & ANNETTE GORDON-REED, VERNON CAN READ! A MEMOIR 176
(2001) (writing about Georgia). It was in the rural areas where the white power structure
prevented unfettered exercise of the franchise. Id.
58. Transcript of the Audio tape: Branton Family History by Sterling Branton 5 (June 1,
1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Sterling Branton, Family History]. His mother had
graduated from Tuskegee Institute and his maternal grandparents had long resided in Pine
Bluff. His maternal grandfather had become prosperous through steady work as a railway
repair shop foreman, a private contractor with the United States Postal Service, and judicious
investments in real estate. Pine Bluff, like some other larger towns in the South, maintained
fewer hard and fast rules about segregation, and Branton's parents and grandparents lived in
a large house in a neighborhood with white families across the street. Telephone Interview
with Sterling Branton (May 15, 2003) (on file with author). Branton and his siblings played
with the neighborhood children of both races. Id. Secure in his place in that world, Branton
was destined for a life of relative ease as manager and owner of the family's cab company
had not World War II intervened. Id.
59. Wiley A. Branton, Draft of Remarks for Founder's Day Program at the University
of Arkansas at Pine Bluff (April 27, 1975) (on file with author).
60. WAB Access 2000 Speech, supra note 27, at 7.
61. Letter from Wiley Austin Branton to the Editor, Pine Bluff Commercial (Nov. 4,
1980) (on file with author). This letter is an example of Branton's concern about setting the
record straight. Branton continued to subscribe to the Pine Bluff newspaper after he left
Arkansas and had noticed Steed's obituary. His letter, he said, was written because "[iut is
easy for people to forget the contributions that people make, particularly after the passage of
time." Id. Branton noted that Steed had not only accepted Branton's help, but had attended
every meeting arranged in the Black community, had treated Blacks with courtesy, and had
not minded being called "George" by Branton. Id. As Branton stated, "[t]hese may seem like
small things now but they meant a lot to me and my colleagues in 1946." Id.
Steed won and, in creating the first municipal park commission in Pine Bluff, care-
fully complied with the law by creating two commissions--one white and one black. Branton
was named as Chair of the Black Commission and presented the names of other individuals
from which Steed selected the remainder of the group. Steed also "saw to it that we received
a fixed percentage of the revenue from the then recently installed parking meters," with
which Branton's group was able to construct a field house and the first swimming pool avail-
able to Pine Bluff's Black citizens. Id.
62. WAB, Pine Bluff essay, supra note 8, at 22-23.
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The 1948 primary elections involved the largest number of Black vot-
ers in Arkansas since the end of Reconstruction.63 The winner of the De-
mocratic Party's gubernatorial primary run-off was Sidney S. McMath, who
was among a group of white war veteran candidates more liberal than the
norm.64 The Democratic Party's Old Guard membership, not liking the re-
sults, assumed there had been fraud at the polls. A grand jury investigation
was instituted. Subpoenaed by investigators, Branton refused to speak about
his registration efforts on the advice of his attorney. 65 He was immediately
charged with violating section 4873 of the Arkansas Penal Code, which
prohibited the duplication of election ballots "for the purpose of instructing
voters how to vote. 66 The deed that resulted in Branton's arrest was making
mimeograph copies of a list of offices to be filled and the names of the can-
didates for each of those offices. Branton then distributed the copies to a
Black audience, along with pencils, and demonstrated the mechanics of
voting.67
Branton was convicted. The case was appealed to the Arkansas Su-
preme Court on two grounds: that the papers he distributed were not "bal-
lots" within the meaning of the statute, and that the statute was an unconsti-
tutional restriction on free speech. Both arguments lost and his conviction
was affirmed. In the only dissent, Chief Justice Griffin Smith stated that "[a]
casual glance at the photographs [of the distributed papers] is sufficient to
show there was no attempt to reproduce a ballot in the sense that the term is
ordinarily used., 68 The United States Supreme Court refused to hear a fur-
ther appeal. 69 Branton was fined $300.70 Section 4873 remained on the
63. Stephan, supra note 57, at 43 (commenting that the exact number of black voters
was not known, but the long-time president of the Arkansas Negro Democratic Association
estimated it to be about 22,600).
64. Id. Civil rights were not an issue in the campaign. On becoming governor, however,
McMath requested the legislature to submit a constitutional amendment to repeal the poll tax.
The legislature failed to comply. McMath also advocated anti-lynching legislation, but could
not get it introduced. Id. at 43-44.
65. WAB Access 2000 Speech, supra 27, at 7-8.
66. Sec. 4873, Ch. 55., Pope's Digest, Vol. 1, Statutes of Arkansas, at 1393 (1937). The
pertinent portion of that section, which appears after a sentence on threatening or intimidat-
ing a voter and before a prohibition of handing out election materials at a voting place, states:
"It shall be unlawful to print or distribute any ballots, outside of those ballots ordered for use
in the election, for the purpose of instructing voters how to vote." Id.
67. See Branton v. State, 214 Ark. 861, 861-62, 218 S.W.2d 691 (1949) (stating that he
showed those assembled at the meeting "how to vote").
68. Id. at 867-68, 218 S.W.2d at 693 (Griffin, J., dissenting).
69. Branton v. Arkansas, 338 U.S. 878 (1949).
70. WAB Access 2000 Speech, supra note 27, at 8 (recalling that the fine was paid by a
collection within the Black community).
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books until 1969,71 although Wiley Branton apparently was the only person
ever convicted under this statute.72
The kind of voter registration work in which Branton engaged in 1946
and 1948 was duplicated across the south.73 Between 1947 and 1952, the
number of registered Black voters increased from twelve to twenty percent
of those eligible.74 As a comparison, the percentage of registered white
southern voters averaged sixty-five percent in 1952.75 In the years follow-
ing, Black voter registration efforts continued, but the post-war energy
flagged and progress was slow. White resistance remained strong.76
B. Voting Rights in the Eisenhower Administration, 1953-1961
Between 1952 and 1960, there were two efforts by the Eisenhower
administration to enact civil rights bills. They were a response to pressure
from three directions. First, the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights,
comprised of more than fifty national civil rights groups, 77 lobbied the
President, members of Congress, and the public. 78 Second, violence against
Blacks took a well-publicized turn when two Mississippi men were killed
for engaging in voter registration, and teenager Emmett Till was murdered,
71. At that time, statutes relating to elections were rearranged, renumbered, and modi-
fied. During this process the language quoted above was eliminated. See sec. 4873, Article
11, Sec. 4 (Misdemeanors), sub-section (cc). The current section is Ark. Code Ann. § 7-1-
103(17) (Michie 1987).
72. Throw Out a Lifeline and Repeal Jim Crow-Again, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE,
June 14, 1994, at 6B.
73. JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE, THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN MISsIssIPPI 28
(1994) (noting that, usually, voter registration drives were "centered on the small black mid-
dle class. Not until the civil rights movement of the 1960s would activists attempt to register
and organize the hundreds of thousands of black sharecroppers and unskilled urban work-
ers.").
74. ROBERT MANN, THE WALLS OF JERICHO: LYNDON JOHNSON, HUBERT HUMPHREY,
RICHARD RUSSELL, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS 152 (1996).
75. Id.
76. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 140 (noting that efforts to pass antipoll-tax legislation in
the United States House of Representatives was thwarted by the southern stranglehold on the
Senate).
77. Id. at 144 (commenting that the Leadership Conference evolved out of earlier un-
successful efforts toward the creation of a federal Fair Employment Practices Commission).
Members included the NAACP, Walter Reuther's United Auto Workers, and the B'nai B'rith
Anti-Defamation League. Id.
78. Id. 144-46. Among the Leadership Conference's suggestions was strengthening of
the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) so that existing voting law
might be enforced. Id. at 146. Because it could not obtain indictments from local grand juries
against local registrars for violating the law, the DOJ spent its energies working with local
white leaders in hopes that registration procedures would be changed voluntarily. Id. These
efforts were seldom successful. Id. (noting that "officials [of Forrest County, Mississippi]
often asked black applicants such questions as, 'how many bubbles are in a bar of soap?"').
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also in Mississippi. 79 Third, President Eisenhower's 1955 heart attack and
the lack of an obvious replacement in the 1956 election compelled the Re-
publican Party to consider the importance of additional Black voters.80
A first civil rights bill, drafted by Attorney General Herbert Brownell
in 1956, proposed creating a Civil Rights Commission (Title I), strengthen-
ing the Civil Rights Division of the DOJ (Title II), and giving the DOJ au-
thority to request court injunctions for violations of civil rights (Title III),
particularly the right to vote (Title IV).8 1 While there were differences of
opinion within the administration over its content, the intact bill went to
Republican legislators for introduction.8 2 The bill passed the House of Rep-
resentatives but was stalled in the Senate by rules and senatorial machina-
tions that prevented its consideration before the 1956 presidential elec-
tions.
83
The Republican effort paid off. Although the bill was unsuccessful, the
mere effort resulted in increased Black votes for Eisenhower. 84 Buoyed by
this result, Eisenhower made it clear that he was in full support of the bill.
85
It was reintroduced. Threatened with even stronger measures if they at-
tempted to filibuster the civil rights bill, Southern Democrats in the senate
worked to "weaken [the bill] by deleting some sections and attaching crip-
pling amendments to others. 86
Opponents most wanted to eliminate Title III, which would allow the
DOJ to obtain injunctions against individuals for any civil rights violations.
Southerners were willing to live with some action regarding voting rights
but managed, with the help of western senators,87 to add a provision that
would provide for a jury trial for any alleged violation, thus keeping the
79. Id. at 148.
80. Id at 150.
81. Id. at 153. Roy Wilkins asserted that the 1957 Act resulted from the efforts of the
NAACP's Clarence Mitchell, who worked with Attorney General Herbert Brownell to de-
velop "a package of civil rights proposals." WILKINS & MATHEWS, supra note 4, at 234.
82. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 153-56.
83. Id. at 159-60. Evidence of the type of actions that could be used in this regard came
from Mississippi Senator James Eastland, who boasted in early 1956 "[y]ou know, [] the law
says the committee has got to meet once a week. Why, for three years I was chairman [of the
Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil Rights], that committee didn't hold a meeting.., for years
I carried those bills around in my pockets everywhere I went and every one of them was
defeated." Id. at 157.
84. Id. at 162.
85. Id. at 165.
86. Id. at 167.
87. Id. at 189. Political wheeling and dealing to exchange votes on a bill to dam the
Snake River in Hell's Canyon between Oregon and Idaho also won some votes for oppo-
nents. ld. at 190. Other votes for a compromise came through the support of organized labor.
Id. at 191 (stating that labor leader John L. Lewis, who had once been fined for ignoring a
federal injunction, put pressure on senators from mining states).
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decision of guilt with local jurors.88 President Eisenhower backed down and
"clarified" his position, stating he did not believe the government could
legislate conduct except in the voting rights arena.89 Title III was elimi-
nated. The remaining parts of the 1957 Civil Rights Act were signed into
law by President Eisenhower on September 9. 90 Black reactions were
92
mixed, 9' while the segregationist South considered it a victory.
The government did little to enforce the Act during the next three
years. Immediately after its passage, Little Rock, Arkansas, exploded over
the issue of school integration, 93 and Eisenhower was distracted. Herbert
Brownell, who drafted the original Act, stepped down as Attorney Gen-
eral.94 He was replaced by William Rogers,95 who took the position that the
DOJ would prosecute only the most egregious violations and, otherwise,
depend on the use of "friendly persuasion" to remedy civil rights com-
plaints. 96 In other words, the federal government would not use its new
powers with regard to voting rights unless a case was foolproof.
Only three cases met that standard before 1960. 97 Two were lost at the
trial level when local federal judges questioned the validity of the 1957 Act
or its application,9" thus requiring time-consuming and expensive appeals to
the United States Supreme Court.99 The third case was a victory for the DOJ
in the trial court, but it, too, was appealed to the Supreme Court, this time
by the defendants.'00 These suits did little to persuade Southern officials to
change the voting situation for Blacks in the South. 10
88. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 169; CARL M. BRAUER, JOHN F. KENNEDY AND THE
SECOND RECONSTRUCTION 10 (1977).
89. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 180.
90. Id. at 199.
91. Id. at 196 (citing the Afro-American newspaper as stating "[a] half-loaf is better than
no bread at all" and the Chicago Defender as calling that position "appeasement").
92. BRAUER, supra note 88, at 10 (reporting "[t]he ability 'to confine the Federal inva-
sion of the South to the field of voting and keep the withering hand of the Federal Govern-
ment out of our schools' was to Georgia's Richard Russell, the leader of the Southern forces,
his 'sweetest victory' in twenty-five years as a Senator").
93. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text; LAWSON, supra note 1, at 204.
94. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 205.
95. Id. at 205.
96. Id. (noting that "the expectation was that once the government won a few landmark
cases, most southerners would recognize the right of Negroes to vote").
97. Id. at 206.
98. Id. U.S. v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960), involving Terrell County, Georgia, was filed
in September 1958. Id. 206-07. The federal trial court declared the Act unconstitutional. Id.
at 207. The second suit, U.S. v. Alabama, 362 U.S. 602 (1960), involved Macon County,
Alabama, and was filed in early 1959. Id. at 209. This time the trial court held the Act did not
apply because it named the state as defendant, rather than any particular "persons." Id. at
210.
99. Id.at207,210.
100. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 211. United States v. Thomas, 362 U.S. 58 (1960), set in
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A strengthened liberal wing in Congress and recognition by political
parties that a focus on civil rights would win Black votes led to an agitation
for stronger laws by both political parties. Proposed bills came from a group
of liberal congressmen and senators, and from Majority Leader Lyndon
Johnson. 10 2 In response, the White House submitted its own proposal. 10 3 In
the end, there was compromise. Instead of an omnibus civil rights bill, the
final product again focused on voting rights.'
0 4
The 1960 Civil Rights Act made two minor improvements to the law:
it required state officials to "preserve federal election records for two years
and make them available to the attorney general for inspection [upon sub-
poena]," and it provided for the appointnient of federal referees where voter
discrimination was documented in specific detail. 10 5 The additional judicial
process was cumbersome 10 6 and continued to rely on "enlightened" South-
ern judges to support the process, despite the DOJ's recent experience.' 0 7
C. Voting Rights in the Kennedy Administration, 1961-1963
The election of John F. Kennedy as President in 1960 offered new
hope for Blacks. During his campaign, Kennedy made numerous statements
Washington Parish, Louisiana, was the only one in which the federal district judge initially
supported the law. Id. at 211.
101. Id. at 216-17. The DOJ's action may be contrasted with that of the new Civil Rights
Commission that, although it began slowly, forged new paths toward highlighting the repres-
sive conditions by using public hearings to educate the nation. Id.
102. Id. at 223. Johnson's bill would have "established an independent conciliation ser-
vice to mediate racial disputes in tense communities, extended the life of the Civil Rights
Commission for two years, and provided for federal investigation and penalties in bombing
cases." Id. It also gave the DOJ authority to subpoena documents. Id. The liberals' bill pro-
vided funds for school systems to integrate, gave the Department of Education and Welfare
authority to create desegregation plans for communities that would not move on their own,
revived the 1957 bill's Title III that gave DOJ authority to sue on behalf of individuals whose
civil rights had been violated, and endorsed the Supreme Court's Brown decision. Id.
103. Id. at 233. The administration's proposal was limited to procedural changes once the
DOJ had obtained a court injunction against voting officials. The proposed law then would
give the judge authority to find a "pattern and practice" whereupon the judge could appoint a
referee to determine if the charges were accurate. If so, the rejected voters were required to
attempt registration a second time (giving the state another chance to follow the law) before
the court would make a final decision against the state defendants.
104. 86 P.L. 449, 74 Stat. 86.
105. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 405 n. 124; see also BRAUER, supra note 88, at 11 (com-
menting that "it did nothing significant about school desegregation or about the apartheid
practices that sit-ins protested while the filibuster droned on").
106. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 233-46.
107. Id. at 249. One observer believed such reliance a futile hope, stating, "[j]udicial




indicating support for new civil rights laws.'0 8 He also ran his campaign in a
way that demonstrated great sensitivity to the feelings of black citizens. For
example, he would not participate in segregated meetings. 109 These actions
made him popular with the Black media and Black citizens, whose votes are
considered to have provided the margin of Kennedy's win.'
Disappointingly, President Kennedy did not propose any civil rights
legislation in 1961.111 Instead, he used executive orders to support civil
rights actions, hoping to avoid confrontations with powerful Southern sena-
tors.112 For example, "[i]n March 1961 President Kennedy issued an execu-
tive order [, E.O. 10925,] ... forbidding racial discrimination in employment
by firms doing business under federal government contracts and subcon-
tracts.
1 13
The DOJ, under Attorney General Robert Kennedy, used the 1957 and
1960 Civil Rights Acts to file fourteen voting rights suits by the end of
1961, more suits than Eisenhower's DOJ had filed in three years." 4 Ken-
nedy's Justice Department, however, followed the Eisenhower model, limit-
ing its litigation to the worst situations and attempting to resolve violations
of the Acts by developing relationships with local officials in an effort to
persuade them informally toward change.'
1 5
Like the Eisenhower Administration, the Kennedys initially failed to
understand how tenaciously protective of its privileges the Southern white
power structure would be and how much support that attitude would receive
from Southern federal judges. The Kennedys would learn, as would the en-
tire country, when local reactions to new civil rights efforts became fodder
for the national media.
108. BRAUER, supra note 88, at 42 (commenting that Kennedy "waged a campaign in
which the elimination of racial discrimination became... a powerful magnet for black votes
and simultaneously raised expectations of what a President might accomplish in the civil
rights area").
109. Id. at 46 (also noting that "several blacks, including Andrew Hatcher, who worked
under Pierre Salinger in press relations, traveled with the Kennedy party and impressed black
newsmen with the importance of the role they played"). The action having the most impact
was Kennedy's telephone call to Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., to express sympathy when her
husband was jailed in Georgia. Id.
110. Id. at 58-59.
111. MANN, supra note 74, at 306.
112. CHARLES V. HAMILTON, THE BENCH AND THE BALLOT, SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES
AND BLACK VOTERS 81-83 (1973).
113. Id.
114. MANN, supra note 74, at 306.
115. Id. at 307 (noting that Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall spent much of his
time working with Southern officials, "establish[ing] important lines of communication with
political and community leaders throughout the south").
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Ill. THE VOTER EDUCATION PROJECT
By 1962 Wiley Branton had been a practicing lawyer for ten years. His
work primarily was the standard legal fare of a small town lawyer, e.g.,
wills and trusts, criminal defense and real property transactions.'1 6 Bran-
ton's interest in civil rights, whetted by his organizing work with the
NAACP in the late 1940s, had continued. He remained active in the
NAACP'1 7 and used his legal skills in a number of important cases. His
1953 service as a special prosecutor was described earlier. 1 8 In 1954 he was
able to reverse a death sentence imposed on a Black defendant for the rape
of a white woman on the ground that the trial court erred in failing to prop-
erly instruct the jury.' 9
In 1956, in addition to handling the Little Rock case of Aaron v. Coo-
per, described earlier,120 Branton began a second case that would take him
to the United States Supreme Court and would, four years later, result in
reversing the murder conviction of a Black man on grounds that his confes-
sion was coerced.' 21 In a third 1956 case, Branton successfully obtained
damages for a black school teacher who was wrongfully denied a contract
renewal by the school district.
122
In 1957 Branton was able to save an elderly black woman's farm by
proving that the lender had charged usurious interest on a crop loan, thus
convincing the court to reverse an adverse judgment.'2 3 In 1961, Branton
was asked by Thurgood Marshall of the NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
tion Fund, with whom he worked during the Little Rock case, to represent a
116. Branton estimated that seventy-five percent of his work was civil law and twenty-
five percent involved criminal law. Personal Data Questionnaire for Wiley A. Branton 5
(undated) (on file with author). About eighty percent of his time during those years involved
state court matters, fifteen percent federal court, and five percent in other courts. Id at 7.
117. Branton became State Director of Branches in 1948. He was a member of the Pine
Bluff Branch Executive Board as early as 1953. Letter to Gloster B. Current, Director of
Branches (Oct. 31, 1953), in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part 11, CIO, Branch Files, Pine Bluff,
1948-55 (on file with the Library of Congress). At the time he filed the Little Rock case in
1956, Branton was chair of the NAACP State Conference of Branches' Legal Redress Com-
mittee. WAB 1969 Interview, supra note 31, at 17 (on file with author). Earlier, in 1953, he
served as Branch President. WAB 1987 Interview, supra note 25, at 110.
118. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
119. Alford v. State, 223 Ark. 330, 266 S.W.2d 804 (1954).
120. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
121. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958). On retrial, Payne was again convicted and
sentenced to death, but the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed the decision at Payne v. State,
231 Ark. 727, 332 S.W.2d 233 (1960).
122. Wabbaseka Sch. Dist. No. 7 of Jefferson County v. Johnson, 225 Ark. 982, 286
S.W.2d 841 (1956).
123. Brooks v. Burgess, 228 Ark. 150, 306 S.W.2d 104 (1957).
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group of Freedom Riders arrested in Jackson, Mississippi. 124 The multiracial
Freedom Riders, members of the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE),
were testing the United States Supreme Court's decision prohibiting segre-
gation on inter-state transportation. 125 Branton also represented students
from Southern University (Louisiana), who were arrested during a 1961 sit-
in in Baton Rouge.
126
Branton thus was a highly experienced lawyer by 1962. He had ap-
peared in the Arkansas Supreme Court numerous times and several times
traveled to represent clients before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and
the United States Supreme Court. This work led Branton to attend and speak
before conventions at venues across the country, 127 so he had met many of
those in various Black communities who were active in civil rights efforts
and he was known to the national media. 28 During this period, he also con-
tinued to operate the family's taxicab business, thus honing his business
skills.
129
Wiley Branton could work, and was at ease, with many different kinds
of people, a skill he developed early by working in the taxicab business
where customers were of all races and ranks. 30 He cared about maintaining
"community" and was a good friend, 13 1 and he made friends everywhere. 132
124. WAB 1970 Interview, supra note 23, at 59.
125. Id.
126. Seeker of Votes in Dixie Drive, ATLANTA INQUIRER, Mar. 31, 1962, at 1.
127. See, e.g., Wiley Branton, A Tribute to Justice Thurgood Marshall 2 (Jan. 12, 1984)
(on file with author) (recalling attendance at annual meetings of the NAACP since 1947).
128. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. Later in 1962 Branton was named one of
the 100 most important young men and women in the United States by LIFE Magazine.
Introducing the Generation, a Foldout Gallery: Young Leaders of the Big Breakthrough, a
Red-Hot Hundred, LIFE, Sept. 14, 1962.
129. Executive Inventory Accuracy Check Form 2, U.S. Gov. CSC Form 161 (stating he
was "President and General Manager from 3-46 to 09-62"). His college major also had been
in business administration. Id. at 3 (noting B.S. degree in 1950).
130. Wiley Branton, Jr., Judge of the Circuit Court, Pulaski County, Arkansas, speech at
a lunch honoring his father, sponsored by the law firm Sidley & Austin (1994) (videotape
and transcript on file with author).
131. Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., Eulogy for Wiley Austin Branton, Sr. (Dec. 19, 1988) (on file
with author) (stating that "Wiley was the one friend who could go the second mile, lend a
helping hand, share and care and come when needed").
132. William Raspberry, A Few Thousand Close Friends, WASH. POST, Dec. 23, 1988
(quoting an attendee at Branton's funeral who commented "[t]here are only two categories of
people,... those who didn't know Wiley at all, and.., those who considered him a close
personal friend"). Branton was able to put people at ease through an incredible facility as a
story-teller. Alice Bullock, former Dean of Howard University School of Law, speaking at a
1992 lunch honoring Wiley A. Branton, remembered that Branton used stories to demon-
strate negotiating points and that she never heard the same story twice. Alice Bullock,
Speech Honoring Wiley A. Branton (1992) (on file with author.) As this author has inter-
viewed friends and associates of Wiley Branton, the skill and humor of Branton's "stories"
are always a major topic of discussion.
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As a young boy, Wiley Branton spent much of his free time accompanying
his maternal grandmother to conventions across the South of the various
civic and social groups to which she belonged, 133 so he saw and learned
about the issues facing Southern Blacks at an impressionable age. With this
background and experience, he had much to offer as Executive Director of
the Voter Education Project (VEP).
A. Creation of the Voter Education Project
The idea for the VEP apparently originated with staff members of the
Kennedy administration, 34 although the Southern Regional Council, a tax-
exempt corporation that would sponsor the project, later took pains to deny
any connection with politics. 35 The administration was concerned about the
denial of voting rights, but the primary motivation for the project was to
reduce the "sit-in" and "freedom rider" confrontations in which some civil
rights activists were engaged by urging them toward more "appropriate"
efforts to effect change. 36 The proposed VEP was designed to focus on
133. Interview with Sterling Branton 5 (July 20, 2000) (on file with author). Effa L.
Stuart Wiley was a member and officer of the Eastern Star Arkansas Jurisdiction, served as a
national officer of the United Brothers of Fellowship, Women's Division, was an active
member of the Eighth Street Baptist Church of Pine Bluff, and served as Vice President for
Arkansas of the Women's National Committee of the National Baptist Convention. Obituary
of Effa L. Stuart Wiley, newspaper and date unknown (copy on file with author).
134. Louis Martin, an adviser to President Kennedy, stated that he, Harris Wofford (Ken-
nedy's 1960 campaign manager and, later, his aide on civil rights), and a few others in the
Justice Department came up with the idea and convinced private foundations to fund it, but
were swom to secrecy so that the project would not be known as a "tool" of the Democratic
Party. Interview by Michael L. Gillette with Louis Martin (June 12, 1986), Transcript, Louis
Martin Oral History Interview II, Internet Copy, LBJ Library 59-60 (on file with author). In
a study of the Congress on Racial Equality's activities during that period, authors August
Meier and Elliott Rudwick stated "[t]he proposal actually emerged out of informal discus-
sions between Burke Marshall, Assistant Attorney-General for Civil Rights, and Harold
Fleming, head of the newly-established Potomac Institute and former director of the SRC."
MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 4, at 173. Both assertions could be accurate.
135. The Voter Education Project, A Concise History, 1962-1979, 2 (undated) (on file
with author). The Southern Regional Council was created in 1919 after a series of race riots
swept the country following World War I. LEWIS & D'ORSO, supra note 4, at 398. It had long
been active in the fight against Southern segregation laws, including the "white primary" and
restrictions on voter registration. Id. The Southern Regional Council was interracial and
primarily a research group that collected and disseminated statistics on various forms of
racial discrimination. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 261-62.
136. BRAUER, supra note 88, at 112-13 (noting that the prospect of additional votes for
the President also was considered); LAWSON, supra note 1, at 261. The underlying goal was
well understood by the youngest of the civil rights leaders. As SNCC member John Lewis
commented, the Kennedys' "priorities at that point were keeping the peace, quelling crises,
positioning the President politically, both in the South and abroad." LEWIS & D'ORSO, supra
note 4, at 178.
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increasing the number of voters in the South through funding grants to
groups willing to work on voter registration and education at a local level.
137
Although the project officially was concerned with all voters, the grants
focused on black voter registration efforts.
At several meetings in June 1961, administration officials (including
Attorney General Robert Kennedy) promoted the VEP idea with the South-
ern Regional Council (SRC) and representatives of the Ford, Field, and Ta-
conic Foundations who were to provide the money, and with leaders of the
major civil rights groups: Roy Wilkins of the NAACP, Martin Luther King,
Jr. of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), James Fore-
man of CORE, Whitney Young of the National Urban League (NUL), and
representatives of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC). 13 8 Before the idea could become reality, however, a number of
hurdles had to be overcome.
Most of the resistance to the idea came from the civil rights groups.
First, they were suspicious of joint ventures.' 39 The files of the NAACP, for
example, indicate concern that participation would lead to loss of its senior-
ity position among the organizations and its independence in the move-
ment.140 SNCC, the most militant group present at those meetings, was re-
luctant to change its focus from sit-ins to voter registration efforts that
seemed relatively tame.' 41 Second, they all were concerned about potential
white violence against those working at the local level. The NAACP, in
137. WAB 1987 Interview, supra note 25.
138. MEIER & RuDWICK, supra note 4, at 173-74.
139. The competition among the groups was legendary. See, e.g., Margaret Long, The
Unity of the Rifting Negro Movement, THE PROGRESSIVE, Feb. 1964, at 10 (exhibiting a biting
humor in her description of the rivalries); PAT WATTERS & REESE CLEGHORN, CLIMBING
JACOB'S LADDER, THE ARRIVAL OF NEGROES IN SOUTHERN POLITICS, 48 (1967) (noting, while
describing the challenges that awaited the VEP director, that "competition among Negro
organizations of any kind is a phenomenon that impresses the most casual observer").
140. Letter from Leslie W. Dunbar, Executive Director, Southern Regional Council
(SRC) to Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary (Sept. 13, 1961), in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part
Ii, A271, Register and Vote-Taconic Foundation, VEP 1961 (on file with the Library of
Congress); Letter from Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary, NAACP, to Leslie W. Dunbar,
Executive Director, SRC (Oct. 17, 1961) in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part III, A27 1, Register
and Vote-Taconic Foundation, VEP 1961 (on file with the Library of Congress); Letter from
Leslie W. Dunbar, Executive Director, SRC, to Roy Wilkins, Executive Secretary, NAACP
(Nov. 10, 1961) in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part III, A271, Register and Vote-Taconic
Foundation, VEP 1961 (on file with the Library of Congress) (on file with the Library of
Congress).
141. LEWIS & D'ORSO, supra note 4, at 178-79. The group was to learn that the experi-
ence would be anything but tame. Congressman John Lewis, one of those involved, later
reflected, "[w]e would learn almost immediately that voter registration was as threatening to
the entrenched white establishment in the South as sit-ins or Freedom Rides, and that it
would prompt the same violent response." Id. at 180-81.
[Vol. 26
WILEY AUSTIN BRANTON
particular, had long experience with white resistance to voter registration
efforts by Blacks.
142
The VEP promoters' response to the first concern was to explicitly ac-
knowledge in the project's structure that the participating groups retained
total independence in their goals and activities. 143 Each could decide
whether or not to submit any of its programs for VEP funding. If a program
were funded, however, they agreed to comply with VEP requirements of
reporting and accounting. The VEP also would maintain a low profile, al-
lowing the groups to generate their own publicity. 144 The second concern
about violence was satisfied, the civil rights groups thought, by a promise of
needed help from administration officials. 145 In the end, the groups also
were won over by the prospect of fresh funding.
1 46
Caution about the VEP idea was not limited to the civil rights groups.
The Southern Regional Council, too, was quite concerned that its tax-
exempt status not be affected by the project. In his letter to the civil rights
leaders describing the proposed project, Executive Director Leslie Dunbar
was careful to include prominent mention of Southern Regional Council's
interest in statistical data.147 Dunbar emphasized this point again in a second
142. The NAACP first began its voting rights work in 1915 when it filed an amicus brief
in Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). KENNETH W. GOINES, THE NAACP COMES
OF AGE: THE DEFEAT OF JUDGE JOHN J. PARKER, at 13 (1990); see also supra notes 17-21 and
accompanying text.
143. Letter from Leslie W. Dunbar, Executive Director, SRC, to Roy Wilkins, Executive
Secretary, supra note 140.
144. BRANCH 1, supra note 4, at 579 (1988) (commenting that "[t]he early successes of
the registration drive [were secret even] from activists in the civil rights movement"). After
some time, this reticence disappeared and the VEP began issuing its own press releases. See,
e.g., Press Release, Voter Education Project (Mar. 1, 1963) in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part
III, A271, file "Register & Vote, Taconic Foundation, VEP 1963-64" (on file with the Li-
brary of Congress).
145. STEvEN F. LAWSON, RUNNING FOR FREEDOM, CiviL RIGHTS AND BLACK POLITICS IN
AMERICA SINCE 1941, 83 (1991) (commenting that federal responses were "ambiguous").
When violence occurred, and the workers turned to the DOJ, the government response was
limited to increased efforts at "gentlemanly persuasion" of local officials. LAWSON, supra
note 1, at 267. Most of the participants in those initial discussions believed that the admini-
stration had reneged on a promise to provide support should there be local resistance to their
activities. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 4, at 174.
146. WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 48; see also Letter from John M.
Brooks, National Voter Registration Chair for the NAACP, to Roy Williams, Executive
Secretary (Sept. 22, 1961), in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part III, A271, Register and Voter,
Taconic Foundation-VEP 1961 (on file with the Library of Congress).
147. Letter from Leslie W. Dunbar, Executive Director, SRC, to Messrs. James Farmer
(CORE), Roy Wilkins (NAACP), Whitney M. Young (NUL), Charles McDew (Chair, Ex-
ecutive Committee, SNCC), Timothy L. Jenkins (National Affairs Vice President, National
Student Association), and the Rev. Wyatt Tee Walker (Executive Director, SCLC) (Sept. 13,
1961), in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part III, A271, Register and Vote-Taconic Foundation,
VEP 1961 (on file with Library of Congress) (stating that the Southern Regional Council was
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letter to Roy Wilkins that stated "[w]e are not an action group ... we can
enter into voter registration work only if it serves our research interest."'
' 48
The low profile to be taken by the VEP would serve the Southern Regional
Council's interests, as well, especially when it learned later that some VEP
money was being used "to feed hungry families cut off from jobs because of
attempts to register to vote. 149
Once an appropriate compromise was reached among the parties, the
VEP needed substance. The man who headed the operation had to be widely
respected, trusted, and knowledgeable about conditions in the South. 50 He
also had to establish office procedures and records systems that would meet
the Southern Regional Council's need for data, and assure that those sys-
tems were maintained.' 5' Finally, given the civil rights groups' suspicions
that the VEP might interfere with their autonomy; he had to run a gauntlet
of approval by the most important civil rights leaders of the day, who each
had very different ideas about what should be done.
5 2
Promoters quickly focused on Wiley Branton as having the experience
and skill needed. Burke Marshall and Robert F. Kennedy met with Branton
to discuss the voter project and asked him to help as its director. 53 His ap-
pointment was announced by Leslie Dunbar to the civil rights leaders in
January 1962. 54 Branton himself wrote to the civil rights leaders on Febru-
ary 22, assuring them that he would begin work as soon as the IRS agreed
that the Southern Regional Council's tax status would not be affected by its
involvement with the VEP.155 Branton was given "semi-autonomous" status
"prepared to accept the responsibility of [sponsorship] in order that, by empirical evaluation
of the results accruing from the programs which you will carry on ... Southern Regional
Council can subsequently draw publishable conclusions").
148. Letter from Leslie W. Dunbar, Executive Director, SRC, to Mr. Roy Wilkins, Ex-
ecutive Secretary, supra note 140.
149. WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 54. On this point, also see BRANCH 1,
supra note 4, at 714-15.
150. WATrERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 48 (noting that he had to be "a powerful
man ... in whom all... had confidence ... [a]nd possessed of broad and minute knowledge
of the Negro South, its over-all psychology and its state-by-state, town-by-town variations").
151. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 264-65. The failure of workers to actually register most of
those they contacted led to an unusual use of narrative reporting from the field, which re-
sulted in poignant vignettes of the difficulties being faced. WATFERS & CLEGHORN, supra
note 139, at 72-73 n.9.
152. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 174-75.
153. WAB 1969 Interview, supra note 31, at 30-31.
154. See Letter from Leslie W. Dunbar, SRC to Roy Wilkins, NAACP (Jan. 2, 1961), in
PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part III, Box A271 (on file with the Library of Congress) (noting
copies to the other civil rights organization leaders).
155. Letter from Wiley Branton to Roy Wilkins, Whitney Young, Martin Luther King,
Jr., James Foreman, and James Farmer (Feb. 22, 1962), in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part III,
Box A271 (on file with the Library of Congress).
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in operating the VEP, 156 and quickly assembled a staff that included
Randolph Blackwell as field director and Frank Minnis as research direc-
tor.
157
B. The Voter Education Project in Action
The VEP was a "moderate" effort. Its financial support was limited,
with only $870,371 available during the two-and-a-half-year period of the
program. 58 This sum was to be distributed among applicants across eleven
southern states. Hard decisions had to be made: What proposals had a
chance of working? Which organizers understood the tax limitations on use
of the money? Who would comply with the documentation requirements
that would allow study of the Project's effectiveness? Where would small
amounts of money achieve the most success?
While waiting for the opening of the VEP's office, civil rights groups
began planning their participation in the voter registration push, training
members and allocating resources that would be put to those purposes. 5 9
Branton made an effort to avoid duplication of effort by encouraging coop-
eration among groups operating in the same areas. 60 Despite their decision
to participate in the VEP, however, the civil rights groups remained highly
competitive. Branton learned that he must assign the different groups to
separate territories.'61
156. WAB 1987 Interview, supra note 25, at 31.
157. Letter from Michael A. Cooke to Wiley A. Branton (Oct. 21, 1985) (on file with
author).
158. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 4, at 175; WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at
49.
159. LEWIS & D'ORSO, supra note 4, at 181 (recalling that "[b]y that fall (1961], SNCC
memorandums were going out labeling voter registration as our top priority .... A plan was
taking shape to send 'field secretaries' into communities throughout the South,.... Small
handfuls of organizers were already out in the field that fall, ahead of the voter registration
machinery still taking shape back at the offices of SNCC and CORE and the SCLC and the
NAACP").
160. MEIER & RuDWICK, supra note 4, at 175.
161. Id. at 175-76. As the distribution evolved, the NAACP and Urban League worked in
states where they had active branches already, which tended to be states that were less resis-
tant (e.g., Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina and Florida), while CORE, SNCC and SCLC
wound up in the very resistant areas of "northern Louisiana, rural South Carolina, southwest
Georgia, and Mississippi." LAWSON, supra note 1, at 264-65. This was not a deliberate
slighting of the younger civil rights groups, but more the result of successful efforts in those
states to eliminate the NAACP. For example, Arkansas's Attorney General Bruce had cham-
pioned statutes in the 1950s that harassed local NAACP chapters and intimidated their mem-
bers. REED, supra note 40, at 245; KIRK, supra note 22, at 158. After 18 months Branton also
found that it was easiest to work with the local workers than with their national offices.
WAB 1969 Interview, supra note 31, at 40.
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The exception to this practice was in the state of Mississippi, where
true coordination among the different groups had been established in 1961.
The Council of Federated Organizations (COFO) included all national,
state, and local protest groups operating in Mississippi. 62 The extremely
hostile environment in which the Mississippi civil rights workers operated
made their organizational differences seem irrelevant.163 Wiley Branton
decided to funnel the VEP's grants for Mississippi work through COFO,
avoiding the need to pick and choose among the individual organizations.'
64
After a year, the VEP could report on numerous efforts across the
South. Success in registering voters varied significantly. In the few areas
where there was little white opposition, workers had to overcome residents'
suspicion of government and convince Blacks that voting had the potential
for improving their lives. 165 In other areas, violence and intimidation meant
civil rights workers paid a heavy price for each successful effort to register.
For example, the Rev. Charles Sherrod wrote in 1962 from Georgia's
"Black Belt" of "the church bumings, jailings, physical attacks, and eco-
nomic reprisals in southwest Georgia during voter registration efforts [and
stating] '[o]ur criterion for success is not how many people we register, but
how many people we can get to begin initiating decisions solely on the basis
of their personal opinion.,'1
66
The state of Mississippi was the worst. Few new voters were being
registered and violence stalked the workers. 167 In February 1963 the de-
pressing accumulation of negative data from Mississippi gave Branton mis-
givings about continuing to put money into the state, and "[h]e sent his VEP
162. DiTTMER, supra note 73, at 119-20 (1994); MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 4, at 269
(calling COFO "a unique phenomenon in the history of the civil rights movement").
163. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 4, at 269 (suggesting that "unity [was] imperative if
the movement was to survive and accomplish anything").
164. Letter from Wiley A. Branton to All Participating VEP Agencies (Oct. 9, 1962), in
PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part VI, 1-3, Voter Education Project, Staff, Branton, Wiley A.,
1962-64 (1 of 3) (on file with the Library of Congress); WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note
139, at 63; BRANCH 1, supra note 4, at 635 (noting "[ilt was a sophisticated piece of political
work").
165. Report, The Voter Education Project, A Concise History, 1962-1979, 4-5 (undated)
(on file with author).
166. WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 7. Looking back on the effort, two ob-
servers commented that there was "no Negro registration to amount to anything in any place
where whites seriously resisted it." Id. at 50.
167. In March 1963 the VEP would report "64 acts of violence and intimidation against
Negroes in Mississippi [alone] since 1961," most of which were a result of registration ef-
forts." News Release, Voter Education Project, in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part III, A271,
file "Register & Vote, Taconic Foundation-VEP 1963-64" (on file with Library of Con-
gress). John Lewis, one of those workers, remembered "[bleatings, arrests and deaths [began
in fall 1961], and things would get much worse before they would begin to get better." LEWIS
& D'ORSO, supra note 4, at 182.
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field director, Randolph Blackwell, to investigate."' 168 On February 28,
while Blackwell was riding in a car with two other civil rights workers after
leaving a meeting near Greenwood, Mississippi, shots were fired from an-
other car that pulled alongside. The driver, James Travis, was seriously in-
jured, and the car was damaged. 169
That event, along with Branton's frustration and that of the civil rights
groups, precipitated an all-out assault on Greenwood, Mississippi. 170 The
avoidance of publicity ended. Branton announced to the media that the VEP
would begin a "saturation campaign."'' 71 A telegram sent to Attorney Gen-
eral Kennedy announced the push and stated "[y]ou must anticipate that this
campaign will be met by violence and other harassment. We are notifying
you in advance so that you can provide the necessary federal protection to
prevent violence and other forms of intimidation against registration work-
ers and applicants. ' 72
Predictably, racist reaction increased in Greenwood. Police dogs were
used to intimidate meetings and inhibit marches to the court house to regis-
ter. 73 Toward the end of March, Bob Moses, one of COFO's leaders, James
Forman (SNCC), and seven others who were promoting the registration
efforts, were arrested.1 74 Wiley Branton flew in to counsel and represent the
jailed workers. 75 All were convicted and given a four-month jail sentence,
which they decided to serve rather than appeal, believing this would pres-
sure the DOJ to act.176
On April 30, the Justice Department, for the first time, "went into fed-
eral court ... [to seek] protection of the right to register and vote, but de-
manded also that the local officials 'release eight Negro voter registration
workers from prison, refrain from further interference with a registration
168. BRANCH 1, supra note 4, at 714-15.
169. WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 59.
170. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 276.
171. Press Release, Voter Education Project (Mar. 1, 1963), in PAPERS OF THE NAACP,
Part VI, 1-3, Voter Education Project Staff, Branton, Wiley A., 1962-64 (1 of 3) (on file with
the Library of Congress); see also WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 59; HOWARD
ZINN, SNCC, THE NEW ABOLITIONSTS 90 (1964).
172. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 276; WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 59.
173. Claude Sitton, Police Loose a Dog On Negroes' Group; Minister Is Bitten, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 29, 1963, at 1; see also ZINN, supra note 171, at 91-93. In a bit of theatre, Bran-
ton was able to "answer[] whites' charges that he was an outside agitator by informing them
that his great-grandfather was Greenwood Leflore, a person of some historical importance to
the area!" DITTMER, supra note 73, at 147-48. In response, some white Greenwood residents
"are said to have responded, '[That nigger] ought not to be talking about things like that."'
WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 60.
174. Claude Sitton, 8 Negroes Jailed In Mississippi, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1962, at 8;
WATERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 61.




campaign and those taking part in it, and permit Negroes to exercise their
constitutional right to assemble for peaceful protest demonstrations and
protect them from whites who might object." 177
Unfortunately, the strong rhetoric didn't stop the government from
later compromising with Greenwood officials. It agreed to drop its request
for an injunction if the local officials would release "the eight jailed workers
and stay execution of their sentences pending a full hearing in late Octo-
ber." 78 None of the others who had been arrested were released and no
promises to stop violence against the civil rights workers were made by the
Greenwood hierarchy.179 The city, which had terminated government food
distribution programs to the poor as a further deterrent to voter registration,
agreed to resume them, "but only after the government agreed to pay for the
cost of the program."' 80
The Justice Department's failure to pursue a full settlement of the civil
wrongs occurring in Greenwood shocked many.18 The government lawyers
clearly had not discussed the deal with Wiley Branton, who publicly
"blamed the Justice Department for not getting any meaningful decrees
from any of the voter suits which have been filed in Mississippi."' 8 2
Despite the tremendous effort that COFO and the VEP put together in
Mississippi, registration results there were minimal. By way of comparison,
the VEP spent $51,345 in Mississippi and $52,958 in Georgia during the
same time period, April 1, 1962 to December 31, 1963. The new voters
177. WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 61-62.
178. DITTMER, supra note 73, at 155-56 (stating that "Doar told Branton that the Justice
Department was afraid it would lose its case in district courts; but the department usually lost
in the lower courts only to have those decisions reversed in the Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, as had been the case with James Meredith. A more plausible explanation is that the
Kennedys feared a race war in Greenwood and that the injunction, if approved, would put the
U.S. Army in the city's streets").
179. Id. at 155
180. Id. at 156.
181. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 278-79. Opinions whether the government should step in
with a police force action were expressed pro and con by politicians, law professors, lawyers,
and others. Id. at 279-82. This was the point when some civil rights workers began to believe
that the federal government was part of the "enemy," and where the DOJ's legal approach
was furthest from being understood by those in the field. Id. at 278-79.
182. Id. at 285 (quoting from a letter Branton sent to Aaron Henry and Robert Moses on
November 12, 1963). Branton also blamed Martin Luther King, Jr. for launching a protest in
Birmingham that resulted in his being jailed and diverted national attention from Mississippi.
BRANCH 1, supra note 4, at 725. The Justice Department was not any happier with its work.
Fifty-eight cases had yielded little change in southern attitudes or compliance with the 1957
and 1960 Civil Rights Acts. Claude Sitton, Negro Queue in Mississippi Is Symbol of Frustra-
tion in Voter Registration Drive, in BLACK PROTEST IN THE SIXTIES 58-59 (August Meier,
John Bracey, Jr. and the late Elliott Rudwick, eds., 1991).
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added in Mississippi totaled only 3,228 while they totaled 46,347 in Geor-
gia. 1
83
In October 1963 Branton gave up on Mississippi. Branton's letter to
COFO's officers stated that the VEP would not continue funding projects in
Mississippi and explained that the government's failure to obtain favorable
court decrees or to protect civil rights workers from violence meant that
resident Blacks would remain afraid to register and the number of voters
would not increase by much. 184
Given Branton's reaction to the February 28 shooting, 185 his subse-
quent devotion of VEP funds to voter registration efforts in Mississippi, and
his personal involvement in representing the civil rights workers there, the
decision to end grants to COFO probably was a bitter pill to swallow. Bran-
ton had rarely failed in any action he began and he was not a quitter. How-
ever, as the caretaker of an organization with responsibility for funding reg-
istration efforts in ten other states, he had to look at the long view. In 1965
testimony during hearings by the United States Civil Rights Commission,
held in Mississippi, Branton stated his belief that the registration efforts in
Mississippi had at least somewhat reduced the "climate of fear."' 86
Branton's frustration about this decision may have been mollified by
his involvement in a new organization made up of the leaders of the major
civil rights organizations, the Council for United Civil Rights Leadership
(CUCRL). CUCRL began in June of 1963 and was not limited, as was the
VEP, in the type of funding it could provide. 187 Civil rights leaders, im-
183. Sitton, supra note 181, at 58-59; see also HARRY S. ASHMORE, CIVIL RIGHTS AND
WRONGS 172 (1994).
184. WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 213, 264-65; MEIER & RUDWICK, supra
note 4, at 260; NICOLAUS MILLS, LIKE A HOLY CRUSADE, MISSISSIPPI 1964-THE TURNING OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 57 (1992).
185. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
186. Hearings Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Vol. 1, Voting, 186.
187. WEISS, supra note 4, at 114 (describing it as the idea of white philanthropist Stephen
Currier, who hoped to focus the various civil rights groups by providing additional resources
through his own foundation and those of other men he knew).
Currier was a wealthy man and his wife was an heir to the Mellon steel fortune.
Reese Cleghom, The Angels Are White, Who Pays the Bills for Civil Rights?, NEW REPUBLIC,
Aug. 17, 1963, at 12. Currier had created the Taconic Foundation as an outlet for his interest
in civil rights, and Taconic provided much of VEP's funding. WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra
note 139, at 49.
The organization's members included Roy Wilkins, James Fanner, Jack Greenberg
of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, Dorothy Height of the National Council
of Negro Women, Martin Luther King, Jr., William Trent, Whitney Young, and C. Eric
Lincoln. Letter from Stephen R. Currier to Roy Wilkins (Feb. 4, 1987), in PAPERS OF THE
NAACP, Part III, A271, Register and Vote, Taconic Foundation-VEP 1963-64 (on file with
Library of Congress). On June 19, 1963 they all met with Currier and "96 corporation and
foundation" heads in New York to discuss the monetary needs of the Movement. Cleghom,
supra, at 12. As a result of their presentations at that meeting, more than $500,000 was
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pressed with the fairness of Branton's work in distributing VEP funds,
asked him to become the executive director. With the consent of the South-
ern Regional Council, Branton agreed. 88 CUCRL met regularly, almost
once a month, 189 and Branton spent the remainder of his time with the VEP
shuttling back and forth between the two positions.' 90 To manage this, he
had the help of a young Vernon Jordan, who was assigned by the Southern
Regional Council to assist Branton with VEP business.' 9' Branton, through
CUCRL, was able to provide some funding to Mississippi projects in
1964.192 During this period, Branton cemented his relations with the leaders
pledged to the cause. WEISS, supra note 4, at 114. Another $300,000 came soon thereafter.
Id. at 117. A two-part legal structure, CUCRL and the Committee for Welfare, Education and
Legal Defense (WELD) was created to handle the money. Co-ordinator Post Assigned To
Branton, ARK. GAZETrE, Aug. 21, 1963, at 10B.
CUCRL survived until January 1967. WEISS, supra note 4, at 118. It was never able
to become a power in its own right. Donations subsided after the first rush of offerings and,
despite several efforts, it could not become self-supporting. In its short life, however,
CUCRL had experimented with a novel method of coordinating the civil rights protest
agenda. It existed and worked successfully to provide focus during an extremely active and
difficult period in civil rights efforts. "John Lewis credited CUCRL with heading off major
misunderstandings among the organizations; it 'kept us together,' he said, and gave the
movement 'that sense of unity and focus that it needed during that time."' Id. Unfortunately,
it could not endure. "Differences in style, a desire for complete autonomy, and concerns over
publicity made it difficult to sustain such coalitions." MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 4, at
224.
188. 7 Civil Rights Groups Choose Coordinator to Bolster Activity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16,
1963; WEISS, supra note 4, at 116.
189. List of Meetings (Apr. 28, 1965) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
190. Letter from Wiley A. Branton, to Jay Goodlette-Bass (Apr. 30, 1965) (on file with
author) (stating that his resignation was accepted at CUCRL meeting of Apr. 28, 1965).
191. Memorandum from Wiley A. Branton, to All Participating Agencies (Sept. 18,
1963) (on file with author). Jordan performed this job while he remained Leslie Dunbar's
executive assistant at the Southern Regional Council. JORDAN, JR. & GORDON-REED, supra
note 57, at 176 (2001).
192. WAB 1970 Interview, supra note 23, at 61. For example, CUCRL made a grant
directly to COFO of $6,000 in July 1964. Council for United Civil Rights Leadership Trans-
actions, Financial Statements (on file with author). A grant of $5,000 was made to COFO's
"Henry for Governor" "mock election" campaign in late October 1963. Council for United
Civil Rights Leadership, Cash Report-8/'63 to 12/2/'63, Financial Statements (on file with
author). COFO sponsored the mock election to demonstrate the ability of Mississippi Blacks
to learn the fundamentals of voting and their interest in doing so. MEIER & RUDWlCK, supra
note 4, at 272-73. COFO contributed to the creation of the Mississippi Democratic Freedom
Party, which sent representatives to challenge the regular electors at the National Democratic
Convention in August 1964. Id. at 279-81. In addition, COFO coordinated planning for a
second massive registration effort during the summer of 1964, using the energies of thou-
sands of white college students from across the country. Id. at 278. "Freedom Summer" led
to more violent reactions from whites. LEWIS & D'ORSO, supra note 4, at 274 (recalling that
"[b]etween June 15 and September 15 our people reported more than 450 'incidents,' ranging
from phone threats to drive-by shootings. There were more than a thousand arrests. There
were eighty beatings. There were thirty-five shootings. There were thirty-five church burn-
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of the major civil rights organizations. He noted, in a later speech, that part
of his job was to know where each of the members could be located in an
emergency, 193 which required constant communication with them.
C. Civil Rights in the Kennedy/Johnson Administration, 1963-1964
As the VEP and civil rights groups were concentrating on registra-
tion efforts in Mississippi from March to October 1963, civil rights mat-
ters also were coming to a head within the Kennedy administration.
Pressured by the newspapers headlines about white violence against
Blacks and by congressional liberals' efforts to move civil rights legisla-
tion without his help, President Kennedy had sent a voting rights bill to
Congress in February 1963.194 Liberal leaders within and outside Con-
gress thought the bill was too limited' 95 and were disappointed by Ken-
nedy's decision not to participate himself in the legislative effort.'
96
Thereafter, however, two events seem to have quickened Kennedy's
interest in civil rights legislation. The first was white reaction to Martin
Luther King's protests in Birmingham, Alabama. 197 The violence by local
officials and the use of police dogs against demonstrators was shown on
national television.' 98 The national public took notice. The second event was
Alabama Governor George Wallace's opposition to the admission of two
black students to the University of Alabama. 199 Shocked by Wallace's con-
duct during negotiations with the DOJ and himself, Kennedy appeared "on
ings. There were thirty bombings.").
193. Wiley A. Branton, Speech for United Planning Organization's Martin Luther King
Breakfast (Jan. 20, 1986) (on file with author).
194. MANN, supra note 74, at 341-42. Kennedy's proposed legislation would have: (1)
provided federal referees in counties where voting rights suits were pending if fewer than
fifteen percent of eligible residents were registered; (2) put voting rights suits on a fast track
in the courts; (3) required equal application of voter eligibility tests by the states; (4) made a
sixth grade education evidence of literacy; (5) given the Department of Education power to
provide local assistance toward school desegregation; and (6) both extended for four years
the Civil Rights Commission and gave it power to respond to requests for help from local
communities. BRAUER, supra note 88, at 221.
195. MANN, supra note 74, at 339 (noting that "NAACP leader Roy Wilkins was one of
many civil rights leaders who worried that Kennedy's 'obeisance' to Southern senators hin-
dered the civil rights movement"); see also BRAUER, supra note 88, at 223.
196. BRAUER, supra note 88, at 222-23. Senator Hubert H. Humphrey told Kennedy
"[t]he leadership for civil rights either has to take place in the White House or it is going to
take place in the streets." MANN, supra note 74, at 343.
197. MANN, supra note 74, at 344 (stating that King was disappointed by the govern-
ment's lack of support and came to believe that only the sight of white violence against
Black demons9trators would gain national attention).
198. BRAUER, supra note 88, at 234.
199. Id. at 252-59.
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national television, announcing his intention to send to Congress the most
sweeping civil rights bill in the nation's history.,
200
After his June 11 speech, Kennedy modified his February legislative
proposal, adding provisions for a cut-off of federal funds to eliminate dis-
crimination in state programs, a ban on discrimination in public facilities
and accommodations, and education and training programs for the under-
privileged and unemployed.20 ' He also issued executive orders relating to
fair employment practices and the creation of a Community Relations Ser-
vice that would replace the DOJ in mediating local civil rights disputes.
2°2
Kennedy was concerned that ongoing civil rights demonstrations
would interfere with his legislation and, on June 22, 1963, he met with civil
rights leaders at the White House to urge a moratorium on their activities,
including a proposed march on Washington, D.C.20 3 Wiley Branton was
invited to attend that meeting.204 Kennedy was not successful with his plea.
The demonstrations, and white reactions to them, continued and escalated.
"Justice Department figures showed nearly eight hundred demonstrations in
almost two hundred cities in the ten weeks following President Kennedy's
announcement that he planned to send a civil rights bill to Congress. During
that ten-week period alone there were 20,000 arrests and ten deaths. 20 5
Liberal legislators added even stronger provisions to Kennedy's re-
vised proposal, resurrecting the Title III provision eliminated from Eisen-
hower's 1957 bill to give the DOJ power to bring suits on its own initia-
tive.206 The administration did not support this stronger version of the bill,
perhaps because it precipitated a dramatic drop in the President's favorable
ratings in the South.20 7 On October 15, 1963, Robert Kennedy testified be-
fore the House Judiciary Committee urging adoption of "the more moderate
initial administration version" of a civil rights bill.20 8
200. LEWIS & D'ORso, supra note 4, at 198; BRAUER, supra note 88, at 259-62.
201. BRAUER, supra note 88, at 266-67.
202. Id. at 267.
203. LEWIS & D'ORSO, supra note 4, at 202-03; MANN, supra note 74, at 371. Kennedy
was wrong about the March's effect. It "gave voice to the growing public support for Ken-
nedy's civil rights program." MANN, supra note 74, at 372.
204. Telegram from John F. Kennedy to Wiley A. Branton (June 15, 1963) (on file with
author).
205. LEWIS & D'ORSO, supra note 4, at 203. On Sunday, September 15, the Sixteenth
Street Baptist Church in Birmingham was bombed, killing four young girls. BRAUER, supra
note 88, at 295.
206. BRAUER, supra note 88, at 303-04. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text.
207. Id. at 298.
208. Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., The Role of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights in the
Civil Rights Struggle of 1963-1964, in THE CML RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, THE PASSAGE OF THE
LAW THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION 49, 59 (Robert D. Loevy, ed., 1997).
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The President's assassination in Dallas on November 3 changed the
government's approach dramatically. When Lyndon Johnson succeeded
Kennedy as President after the assassination, he took up the challenge of
civil rights and made passage of the stronger bill a memorial to President
Kennedy.2°9 Johnson used his political expertise to create a group of aides,
elected and appointed officials, and private citizens that would act in con-
cert to prevent the anticipated Southern filibuster and assure the bill's pas-
sage.210 Johnson also included the civil rights leaders in his planning.211 The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 passed the Congress and was signed into law on
212July 2, 1964. At a private meeting immediately after the signing cere-
mony, Johnson met with Black leaders at the White House in an effort to
obtain their cooperation with a careful implementation of the Civil Rights
Act.
2 13
D. Branton as Lawyer
Wiley Branton could not ignore his legal skills while he managed the
VEP. As he put it, "I frequently went to the rescue because I knew about the
incidents first and there was no one else to call on." 214 There still were very
few Southern lawyers to represent civil rights workers and demonstrators.215
As Branton put it in testimony before the United States Civil Rights Com-
mission in 1965, he often was called because he was so well-known, even
though it was not part of his VEP responsibilities.1 6 Branton's Arkansas
background and legal practice had given him an understanding of how rural
law operated. He also had a couple of qualifications not shared by the few
209. BRAUER, supra note 88, at 314.
210. MANN, supra note 74, at 398 (noting "[tihe civil rights forces were organized as
never before.")
211. White House records indicate telephone calls to Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young
soon after Johnson came to the presidency, and regular conversations and meetings through-
out his administration. MICHAEL R. BESCHLOSS, TAKING CHARGE, THE JOHNSON WHITE
HOUSE TAPES, 1963-1964 28, 30, 37 (1997) (indicating calls on November 24 and 25, 1963).
212. 88 P.L. 352, 78 Stats. 241; BESCHLOSS, supra note 211, at 450 n.5. The law pro-
vided for elimination of discrimination in public accommodation and termination of federal
funding to programs that were discriminatory. Robert D. Loevy, The Impact and Aftermath
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW
THAT ENDED RACIAL SEGREGATION 333 (Robert D. Loevy, ed., 1997).
213. Memorandum from Lee C. White to The Files, titled "Meeting with Negro Leader-
ship following Signing Ceremony," (July 6, 1964) (WHCF, President's Appointment File
[Diary Backup], Box 7, LBJ Library).
214. WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 100.
215. Id. at 99-100 (noting that "[w]hen the rights movement swept over Mississippi in
1963, only four Negro lawyers were practicing in the state.., at one point, three of the four
active Negro lawyers were heavily involved in rights cases").
216. Hearings Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Vol. 1, Voting, 184.
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other Black lawyers around: his accent was not identifiably "Black, 21 7 and
in appearance he could be easily mistaken for white.218 These attributes
would prove useful on numerous occasions. To illustrate the extent of his
legal representation during his time with the VEP, consider the examples
that follow.
On two occasions, Branton was called to represent James Forman, later
head of SNCC, against charges brought in Mississippi. The first, in late Au-
gust 1962, involved charges of loitering after Forman left a Clarksdale, Mis-
sissippi, COFO meeting. Wiley Branton was required to argue that one
could not loiter in a moving car.219 The second occurred on March 29, 1963,
after Forman had been arrested with seven others for refusing to disperse
during a march to the Courthouse in Greenwood, Mississippi.
22 °
On another occasion, Branton successfully obtained the release of
David Dennis, a CORE worker arrested in Clarksdale, Mississippi, in 1962
or 1963 for refusing to say "sir" to a policeman who had stopped him for
questioning and called him "nigger.
' 221
On June 10, 1963 Branton was able to obtain the release of a number
of activists by telephone. Fannie Lou Hamer, Annelle Ponder, Rosemary
Freeman, Elvester Morris, and June Johnson were arrested in Winona, Mis-
sissippi, on their way back to Greenwood from a citizenship workshop.222 A
SNCC worker sent to bail them out also disappeared. 3 Martin Luther King,
Jr. asked Andrew Young to see if he could get them all out of jail.224 When
Young arrived, he and a companion hesitated to come to the point with the
217. YOUNG, supra note 5, at 257.
218. WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 111, n 19. The file on Branton created
by the Mississippi Sovereignty Commission also testifies to these facts. Mr. A. L. Hopkins,
reporting on the trial of 27 Freedom Riders in Jackson, Mississippi, on May 29, 1961, stated
"The Defense Attorneys were ... ; Wiley Branton, colored, male, Pine Bluff, Arkansas.
(Branton appears to be a white man; however, I have been informed by Chief M.B. Pierce
that he is a Negro.)." Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Records, SCR ID # 2-55-2-
99-1-1-1, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, p. 1.
219. BRANCH 1, supra note 4, at 635-36 (noting that Branton paid the resulting fine "out
of VEP funds"). In testifying about the event before the United States Civil Rights Commis-
sion in 1965, Branton commented "I had practiced law for about eleven years,. . . and I must
admit I never heard of [a charge like that]." WATrERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 64.
220. Report of Tom Scarbrough, Investigator, Mississippi Sovereignty Commission,
(Mar. 25-Apr. 3, 1963), Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Records, SCR ID #2-45-
1-71-4-1-1, Mississippi Department of Archives and History, pp. 3-4; see also supra notes
174-76 and accompanying text.
221. MEIER & RUDIWCK, supra note 4, at 179.
222. YOUNG, supra note 5, at 253.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 254.
[Vol. 26
WILEY AUSTIN BRANTON
sheriff, but Wiley Branton telephoned the sheriff's office while Young was
there and cajoled the sheriff into releasing the prisoners on bail.225
In June 1963 Jack Pratt, a lawyer for the Commission on Religion and
Race of the National Council of Churches, attempted to obtain the release of
Mississippi movement people who had disappeared from sight.226 Pratt
needed the help of James Forman (CORE) and Wiley Branton to work his
way through the maze of the state's criminal justice system. 7
Branton described his experience in representing a number of civil
rights workers accused of various misfeasances in Indianola, Mississippi
(precise date unknown), to the United States Civil Rights Commission in
1965. On that occasion, without hindrance from the chief of police or re-
monstrance from the judge, a white man sprayed Branton and his clients in
the face with an insecticide, stating loudly, "I have got to de-niggarize
this.
228
In April 1964 John Due, a VEP field worker, was arrested while gath-
ering affidavits throughout Mississippi for submission to the U.S. Commis-
sion on Civil Rights.229 The statements were confiscated along with his
other identification and documents.230 Due paid a bond and was let go but
ordered to return for trial. He contacted Branton for advice on how to pro-
ceed.23 '
As a final example, when two young voter registration workers were
jailed in one of the plantation counties of south Georgia, Branton called the
sheriff, put on his best drawl and "good-old-boy" informality, and greeted
him like an old friend. After quickly convincing the sheriff they knew each
other, Branton was able to bail out the workers. 232
225. Id. at 256-57 (stating that "Wiley ... was one of the most important and effective
black civil rights attorneys during the Southern movement"). This was a time when Bran-
ton's white-sounding accent was useful.
226. BRANCH 2, supra note 4, at 128.
227. Id.
228. Hearings Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Vol. 1, Voting, 184.
229. WATrERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 199.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 202 (stating "[u]pon the advice of Mr. Wiley Branton, I asked Mr. [Courtney]
Siceloff [United States Commission on Civil Rights] to be a witness or ascertain whether a
member of the FBI would be present").
232. Id. at 111 n. 19 (stating that Branton justified his interest to the sheriff by claiming
that the mother of one of the young men worked for him and was too upset to do a good job).
Branton told that story during a speech in 1988, stating that it was the only time he was will-
ing to devalue the life of a Black man as compared with a white one, because it meant a




Establishing and directing the VEP's operations was a complicated
business. Branton had to push the registration efforts forward while de-
manding that the workers take time to provide the detailed reports that
would justify their funding.233 He also had to avoid bruising egos or other-
wise offending the civil rights leadership in determining which programs
would receive VEP grants. The psychological demands of the job on Bran-
ton should not be overlooked, either.
The juxtaposition of extreme violence with the mundane irritations of
bureaucracy were constant. One example was the aftermath of the February
1963 shooting in Mississippi. 234 The car in which the three men were riding
happened to be a rental from Hertz. The company charged the VEP a $112
insurance deductible for damage to its car and $12.50 in towing costs. Bran-
ton objected to the charges, arguing that "the total damage to the vehicle
consisted of that caused by bullets," for which the car's occupants were not
responsible. He suggested the damage should be covered by general com-
prehensive insurance because it resulted from "malicious mischief or van-
dalism." The towing charge, he said, was incurred when the police confis-
cated the car from the hospital parking lot; again, not through any action of
the occupants. 235 Branton's protest was successful. A Hertz employee's
response dated June 5 agreed with Branton's conclusions and stated
"[n]eedless to say, we regret the circumstances under which this transaction
took place, and we certainly hope that there will be no further repetition."
236
A second example of the combination of violence and good business
practice can be seen in the VEP's budget planning. When it began in 1962,
233. In addition to eliminating VEP grants to COFO, described earlier, Branton was
required to cut funding temporarily from Martin Luther King, Jr.'s, Southern Christian Lead-
ership Conference when reports were not submitted after several requests. WAB 1970 Inter-
view, supra note 23, at 33. Similar temporary cuts were made to NAACP funding. See, e.g.,
letter from Wiley A. Branton to Mr. Fred D. Alexander 5 (Dec. 31, 1964), in PAPERS OF THE
NAACP, Part VI, 1-3, Voter Education Project, Staff, Branton, Wiley A., 1962-64 (3 of 3)
(on file with the Library of Congress); Letter from John A. Morsell, Assistant Executive
Director, NAACP, to Vernon Jordan, VEP (Dec. 31, 1965), in PAPERS OF THE NAACP, Part
III, Box A212, Administration-General Office File, "Leagues & Organizations, SRC, Inc.
general 1961-65" (on file with the Library of Congress) (admitting that its involvement with
the first VEP "was marked occasionally by misunderstanding and by certain problems we
faced in complying with the financial requirements").
234. See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
235. Letter from Wiley A. Branton to Hertz System, Inc. (May 2, 1963) (on file with the
Southern Regional Council Papers, Reel 173, Auburn Avenue Research Library, Atlanta-
Fulton Public Library System, Atlanta, Georgia).
236. Letter from R.E. Perrine, Hertz System Inc., to Wiley A. Branton (June 5, 1963) (on
file with the Southern Regional Council Papers, Reel 173, Auburn Avenue Research Library,
Atlanta-Fulton Public Library System, Atlanta, Georgia).
676 [Vol. 26
WILEY AUSTIN BRANTON
VEP's budget looked like that of any other organization, containing catego-
ries for salaries, taxes, travel, rent, benefits, and the like.237 After the first
year, when almost $500.00 was spent on payments to various small town
courts for bail or fines and to repair damage caused by white violence, a
category for "harassment" was added to the budget.238 Harassment contin-
ued to be a problem and was included as a line item in succeeding budg-
ets.239
The original VEP ended its prescribed period of operation in fall
1964.240 In its two-and-one-half years of operation, 688,000 Black voters
had been added to the rolls of the eleven Southern states.241 To put that
number in context, it was more than half the total number of southern
Blacks registered-I ,226,200-in the twenty years since the Smith v. All-
wright decision. 242 While this number is impressive, it still represented only
40.8% of eligible Black voters in those states.
243
The total registration number could have been much higher had south-
ern officials not illegally prevented civil rights workers from bringing new
voters to register and had registrars not been able to evade the law with tac-
tics like closing the offices when Blacks lined up to register, 244 using unfair
237. VEP Budget Comparison (May 8, 1063) (on file with the Southern Regional Coun-
cil Papers, Reel 173, Auburn Avenue Research Library, Atlanta-Fulton Public Library Sys-
tem, Atlanta, Georgia).
238. Memorandum from Jean Levine to Wiley A. Branton (May 6, 1963) (on file with
the Southern Regional Council Papers, Reel 173, Auburn Avenue Research Library, Atlanta-
Fulton Public Library System, Atlanta, Georgia) (noting that no provision for it had been
included in the first year's budget and that VEP had spent $472.56 "for harassment reasons
during the first year alone").
239. See, e.g., "Voter Education Project Budget 1964-1965" in which $500 was allocated
(Southern Regional Council Papers, Reel 173, Auburn Avenue Research Library, Atlanta-
Fulton Public Library System, Atlanta, Georgia).
240. WATrERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 46.
241. WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 69-70. The VEP had provided grant
funds to organizations that registered 327,588 of that total, and provided other types of assis-
tance to voter registration groups. "The Voter Education Project, A Concise History, 1962-
1979," 6.
242. WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139 at 26-27.
243. WAT-rERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at Appendix II. While the problems en-
countered by Wiley Branton during the first VEP did not disappear entirely during subse-
quent VEP operations, they diminished significantly where federal registrars were appointed
under the 1965 Act. Id. at 181. After the 1965 Voting Rights Act was passed, a new VEP
emerged, with Vernon Jordan at its head. JORDAN & GORDON-REED, supra note 57, at 179. In
one year, total registration passed 50% of eligible Blacks. WATrERS & CLEGHORN, supra
note 139, at 69-70. John Lewis took Jordan's place in 1970. LEWIS & D'ORSO, supra note 4,
at 434. By that time, VEP was bringing Black elected officials into Black neighborhoods and
towns, to illustrate the accomplishments of voting. Id. at 435. During its existence, VEP
received no federal funding and was supported completely through private money. Letter
from Wiley A. Branton to Editor, WASH. POST, May 19, 1987 (on file with author).
244. MEIER & RuDWlCK, supra note 4, at 266.
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literacy tests and poll taxes,245 and refusing to designate or canceling author-
ized registration sites in Black communities.246
On February 17, 1965 Wiley Branton testified before the United States
Commission on Civil Rights, which held hearings in Jackson, Mississippi,
on voter registration activities.247 When asked what he would do to improve
the situation in Mississippi, Branton suggested that the full weight of the
President's office should put pressure on states and, if that effort did not
change the situation within a short period of time, then the stationing of
federal troops "or the appointment of a military government" should oc-
cur.
248
Despite having to make decisions that upset and angered various peo-
ple,249 Wiley Branton "emerged from the [VEP] job with his prestige in the
movement intact., 250 The integrity and wide range of skills that he brought
to the job had allowed him to administer a unique program successfully.
Between February 1962 and April 1965, Branton's contacts in both the
Black and white communities of the South expanded exponentially. The
publicity that followed the voter registration effort displayed his skills to the
nation. Branton became known as someone who could get things done. His
name was well-known in Washington, D.C. through his frequent communi-
cations with the Department of Justice.
IV. THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, 1965
When his work with the VEP ended, Wiley Branton looked around for
other challenges. Although he initially intended to return to private practice
in Arkansas,25' he also applied for the position of Southeast Regional Direc-
tor of a United States Office of Economic Opportunity branch and was re-
ceiving favorable consideration. 52 Suddenly, Vice President Hubert H.
Humphrey asked him to move to Washington, D.C., and aid in government
245. QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-
1990, 30, 32 (Chandler Davidson & Bernard Grofian, eds., 1994).
246. Id. at 76. Twenty years later Wiley Branton recalled that "in 1963 some counties in
Virginia gave a printed voter registration form to whites and a blank sheet to blacks. If black
registrants could not fill out the form in the exact order of the printed sheet, they were dis-
qualified from voting." Jacqueline Trescott, The Voting Struggle; Marking 20 Years of Ballot
Rights Battles, WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 1988 at Cl.
247. Hearings Before the United States Commission on Civil Rights, Vol. 1, Voting, 176.
248. Id. at 188.
249. See supra notes 184, 233 and accompanying text.
250. WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 48.
251. WAB 1970 Interview, supra note 23, at 44.
252. Memorandum from Sargent Shriver to John W. Macy, Jr., (Apr. 6, 1965) (on file




efforts to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by working with the Presi-
dent's Council on Equal Opportunity. 3
This opportunity was powerfully attractive to Branton. While directing
the VEP, Branton had learned in graphic ways the importance of federal
support for civil rights efforts.254 President Lyndon Johnson had vowed to
use his administration to push a civil rights agenda.255 The President's
Council position offered Branton the chance to continue his civil rights
work with access to the highest federal authority.256 In a memo dated April
30, 1965, Humphrey informed President Lyndon B. Johnson that Wiley
Branton had been hired as executive director of the Council, noting that
"[h]e has the respect and confidence of both the leaders of major civil rights
groups and of the white Southern moderates.,
257
Presidential Councils already had a venerable civil rights history. In
1946 President Truman appointed the Presidential Committee on Civil
Rights to recommend steps "to secure racial justice in the [southern] re-
gion. 2 58 The Committee's October 1947 report, "To Secure These Rights",
was a sweeping indictment of the South's racial order., 259 It led President
Truman to send "the first civil rights legislative package [] to Congress
since Reconstruction. 26 ° Unfortunately, that bill failed to pass, and Tru-
man's efforts led Southern Democrats to leave the Party and to challenge
him in the next election.26'
253. WAB 1970 Interview, supra note 23, at 44.
254. WAB 1969 Interview, supra note 31, at 60-61.
255. BRAUER, supra note 88, at 314.
256. WAB 1969 Interview, supra note 31, at 60.
257. Memorandum from HHH to LBJ (Apr. 30, 1965) (on file with the Hubert H. Hum-
phrey: Vice Presidential Files: Civil and Human Rights Files, Box 826, Minnesota Historical
Society). Humphrey concluded, "[h]e comes most highly recommended and will, I am sure,
do an outstanding job." Id. An internal memorandum relating to Branton's appointment
indicates that Johnson did not want to create a permanent position with the Council. Memo-
randum from GER [George E. Reedy, Johnson's Press Secretary] to the President (May 3,
1965) (on file with the WHCF Name File-BRANTLEYA, Box 428, LBJ Library) (contain-
ing Johnson's handwritten notes stating "don't want to be permanent-time limit-with
letter-last about 3 mo").
258. JOHN A. SALMOND, MY MIND SET ON FREEDOM, A HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1954-1968, 19 (1997); LAWSON, supra note 1, at 78.
259. SALMOND, supra note 258, at 19; WILKINS & MATHEWS, supra note 4, at 200 (not-
ing that the report contained 35 specific recommendations that the NAACP used as a guide
over the "next two decades"). The Committee's recommendations "comprised a bold blue-
print for racial change: a federal antilynching law, the abolition of the poll tax, an end to
segregation on interstate transportation and in the nation's capitol, the withdrawal of federal
funds from institutions practicing segregation, and the establishment of a permanent civil
rights section within the Department of Justice." SALMOND, supra note 258, 19-20.
260. SALMOND, supra note 258, at 20; LAWSON, supra note 1, at 78.
261. Id. at 20.
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Dwight D. Eisenhower appointed the President's Committee on Equal
Employment Opportunity,262 which worked quietly to persuade federal con-
tractors to increase hiring of minorities by requiring them to "search aggres-
sively for qualified minority applicants" who would then compete with oth-
ers on an equal footing.
263
Soon after Lyndon Johnson's 1964 election, he asked Vice President
Humphrey to suggest means by which the civil rights functions of federal
agencies could be coordinated. 26 On January 4, 1965, Humphrey suggested
the creation of a President's Council on Equal Opportunity that would have
no "operational responsibilities," but would "perform planning, evaluative,
advisory, and coordinating functions. 265 Humphrey's memo listed more
than eleven different government entities that had specific responsibilities
under the 1964 Act and noted that other offices also were given similar re-
sponsibilities.266 Coordination clearly was needed.
Humphrey proposed that the new President's Council be small and
flexible and have authority to obtain regular reports from all agencies on
their civil rights activities to focus on particular problems and to request
resources, personnel, and expertise from the various agencies and offices.
267
The "particular problems" on which he suggested the Council could focus
were "employment, Title VI [school desegregation] implementation, proce-
dures for filing complaints, and education [of the various agencies as to
what each was doing]. 268
Johnson approved the plan and issued Executive Order 11197, creating
the Council on February 5, 1965.269 Humphrey was chair; other members
were cabinet officers and agency heads with major civil rights responsibili-
ties.270 The Council was charged with "coordinating the many and diverse
civil rights activities presently being undertaken by the departments and
agencies of the Federal Government., 27 1 Humphrey himself was asked to
262. Nicholas Lamann, Taking Affirmative Action Apart, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1965, § 6,
at 36, Col. 1.
263. Id.
264. Letter from Hubert H. Humphrey to President Lyndon B. Johnson (Jan. 4, 1965) (on
file with author).
265. Id.
266. Report to the President, On the Coordination of Civil Rights Activities in the Fed-
eral Government, Submitted by the Vice President-Elect (Jan. 4, 1965).
267. Id. at 25.
268. Id.
269. White House Press Release, "The White House Made Public Today the Following
Letter from The President to The Vice President" and attaching Executive Order "Establish-
ing the President's Council on Equal Opportunity" (Feb. 9, 1965).
270. Id. at 2.
271. Id. at 1.
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"make such suggestions and recommendations for changes and improve-
ments as occur to you.
272
Humphrey lost little time in implementing Johnson's Order. In his first
meeting with Council members, on March 3, 1965,273 Humphrey stressed
the fact that the Committee was not to become a new bureaucracy. All op-
erational responsibility for civil rights enforcement would remain with the
separate agencies. The Council would provide communication between
those agencies, with the purpose of reducing duplication, enforcing consis-
tency in response, and assuring that the concerns of local entities-state
governors, mayors, and private groups-would be heard and receive prompt
attention.274
Three task forces were created at that initial meeting, one each to focus
27
on: (1) anticipated violence in urban areas during the summer,27 (2) em-
ployment discrimination,276 and (3) discrimination in education.277 The
Council's most important duties would be to channel complaints by citizens
and civil rights groups quickly to the appropriate office for action and to
maintain contact with complainants until some final response was made.278
The order creating the Council also provided for an Executive Secre-
tary to "assist the chairman and the Council" and "perform such functions
as the chairman or the Council may assign or delegate to him."279 Wiley
Branton began work in April and was formally introduced to Council mem-
bers at a second meeting on May 19, 1965.280 His appointment was consid-
ered by many as a coup for the administration.28'
272. Id.
273. Minutes of Organizational Meeting, Wednesday, March 3, 1965, President's Coun-
cil on Equal Opportunity, at 1 (Personal Papers of Ramsey Clark, Box 74, LBJ Library).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 4. Former Governor LeRoy Collins, Director of the Community Relations
Service, was to work with the mayors of major cities to direct federal programs that might
alleviate some of the problems that led to riots. Id.; see also Memorandum from Collins to
The President (Apr. 12, 1965) (WHCF, EX FG-155-18, Community Relations Service,
11/23/63-8/23/65, Box 229, LBJ Library) (responding to complaints from Chicago Mayor
Richard Daley about Collins' efforts to meet with several mayors of large cities).
276. Minutes of Organizational Meeting, Wednesday, March 3, 1965, President's Coun-
cil on Equal Opportunity at 4 (Personal Papers of Ramsey Clark, Box 74, LBJ Library).
Former Governor David L. Lawrence, Chair of the President's Committee on Equal Oppor-
tunity in Housing, would work to eliminate overlapping jurisdiction and conflicting policy
within the government and interact with local community groups to educate citizenry on the
new laws. Id.
277. Id. Commissioner of Education Francis Keppell would attempt to coordinate the
approach to implementing the 1964 Act within relevant government offices and to provide
information to schools affected by the Act. Id.
278. Id. at 1.
279. Exec. Order No. 11197, 30 Fed. Reg. 1721 (Feb. 9, 1965) (establishing the Presi-
dent's Council on Equal Opportunity, Section 3).
280. Memorandum from Wiley Austin Branton to Members of the President's Council on
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Branton's primary duty was channeling information to the Vice Presi-
dent. Soon after his appointment, Branton, as intermediary for communica-
tions within the Council, was writing weekly memos to Humphrey reporting
on the activities of Council staff, its various committees, and Council mem-
bers.282 Portions of these memos were sent virtually unchanged by the Vice
President to the President.283
Branton's background and contacts made him particularly useful in
dealing with private civil rights groups, 284 so he advised Humphrey on nu-
ances of Black-white relations in local communities where the Vice Presi-
dent was scheduled to speak.285 He kept abreast of many of the smallest
Equal Opportunity, Their Alternates and other attending the Council Meeting, May 19, 1965
(May 28, 1965) (on file with author) (attaching three-page "Minutes of Second Meeting")
(Hubert H. Humphrey: Vice Presidential Files: Civil and Human Rights Files, Box 826,
Minnesota Historical Society).
281. See, e.g., Editorial, In Line, PINE BLUFF COMMERCIAL, May 4, 1965, at 4 (stating
that Wiley Branton "has a reputation for inspiring confidence beyond any one circle of public
opinion"). The Commercial editorial continued, "[hie is an individual whose forthright man-
ner and quiet assurance lead one to think of him, and deal with him, first as a man and only
secondarily as a representative of any one race, region or state.., his talents as a lawyer and
counselor have attained a national scope." Id.
The Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., sent a congratulatory telegram to Branton, stating
"[i]t goes without saying that this is a most significant appointment and I can think of no one
who could do the job more competently and superbly as you. Your unswerving devotion [sic]
to the cause of civil rights, your tremendous effective ability to work with all civil rights
groups and your great talents uniquely equip you to do this job. We are all very proud of
you." Telegram from Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. to Wiley Austin Branton (May 3, 1965)
(attached to Wiley Austin Branton's May 28, 1965 response).
For the Black press, Wiley Austin Branton "became the new 'wonder man' in the
LBJ Administration in Washington, . . . [assigned] 'to put flesh on the skeleton' [of the
Council]." Ark. Atty. Gets Top U.S. Rights Post, JET, June 10, 1965 (predicting that Branton
would "not only will become a major advisor to Vice President Humphrey but the President
will look to him for immediate action on coordination of a huge government program which
touches school integration, housing, the anti-poverty set-up and the employment programs").
282. See, e.g., Memoranda from Wiley Austin Branton to The Vice President (May 28,
1965; June 4, 1965; June 12, 1965; June 25, 1965; July 12, 1965; July 23, 1965; Aug. 6,
1965; Aug. 13, 1965; Aug. 20, 1965; Aug. 28, 1965; Sept. 13, 1965; Sept. 20, 1965) (on file
with the Hubert H. Humphrey: Vice Presidential Files: Civil and Human Rights Files, Box
826, Minnesota Historical Society).
283. See, e.g., Memoranda from The Vice President to The President (June 8, 1965; June
15, 1965; June 29, 1965; July 8, 1965; Aug. 2, 1965) (on file with the Hubert H. Humphrey:
Vice Presidential Files: Civil and Human Rights Files, Box 826, Minnesota Historical Soci-
ety).
284. Memorandum from Wiley Austin Branton to the Vice President (June 14, 1965) (on
file with author) (notifying Humphrey that Branton would be attending two meetings of civil
rights organizations and leaders "in order to maintain continued communication with the top
leadership").
285. Memorandum from Wiley Austin Branton to William Connell (June 14, 1965) (on




details relating to the government's civil rights efforts, using his personal
knowledge of local communities to contribute to that work.286 Branton also
occasionally provided background information and analysis on civil rights
relations for members of the President's staff.
287
For many Blacks with complaints about discrimination, Branton was
the federal government. To him fell responsibility for receiving complaints,
directing them to the appropriate government office, and maintaining con-
tact until a resolution was developed. His files are replete with requests and
complaints from individuals across the country. Branton reviewed the com-
plaints he received and forwarded those having merit to government offi-
cials and employees who could investigate and resolve them.288 For exam-
ple, he worked with members of the Department of Health, Education &
Welfare to investigate and resolve complaints arising out of the systematic
firing of Black teachers in the South following desegregation of schools
under Title VI regulations. 289
Branton also provided effective public relations for the administra-
tion's civil rights work. As noted earlier, Branton's appointment to the job
itself had been "news."2 90 The appointment and his existing reputation re-
sulted in numerous invitations to speak before various groups on govern-
ment efforts to implement the 1964 Act.29 1 "In both public speeches and
286. For example, in July 1965, he wrote to the Acting Director of the Community Rela-
tions Service suggesting that the list of names proposed as members of a National Citizens
Committee did not include one Black person among the thirteen from Arkansas and that
consideration should be given to establishing good relations in the Black community in case
the Community Relations Service wanted to become active there later on. Letter from Wiley
Austin Branton to Calvin Kytle, Acting Director, Community Relations Service (July 8,
1965) (on file with author).
287. Memorandum from Wiley Austin Branton to Lee C. White, Special Counsel to the
President (June 22, 1965) (on file with author) (interpreting motives behind telegram to
President from DC Branch of NAACP regarding a meeting to discuss appointments to EEOC
(believing only whites were being hired)).
288. See, e.g., Letter from Wiley Austin Branton to Frederick D. Williams, Philadelphia,
PA, (July 26, 1965) (on file with author) (reporting on Branton's investigation of William's
complaints against the Internal Revenue Service and stating that the facts of his (Williams)
treatment did not demonstrate illegal discrimination); see also Letter from Wiley Austin
Branton to Mrs. Zeola Vaughn, DeKalb, TX (Sept. 22, 1965) (on file with author) (asking for
more information so he could be more specific in his advice); memorandum from Wiley
Austin Branton to Samuel F. Yette, Office of Economic Opportunity (Sept. 22, 1965) (asking
whether there was an agency in Mrs. Vaughn's area).
289. Letter from Wiley Austin Branton to James M. Quigley, Assistant Secretary, De-
partment HEW (June 1965) (on file with author).
290. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
291. Between May 28 and August 16, 1965, Branton spoke before Community Relations
Service consultants, youth program attendees at the annual NAACP convention, EEOC com-
pliance officers in training, a group of African students attending American colleges, an
HEW regional conference, the Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, and the annual convention of the
Postal Alliance. See Memoranda from Wiley Austin Branton to the Vice President (May 28,
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private conversations, he [explained] the function of the Council and the
Government's civil rights program and [asked] the civil rights leaders for
their suggestions and opinions. 292
Branton believed that the Council's efforts encouraged federal entities
to give civil rights issues the importance demanded by the President. In a
1969 interview, he recalled that the Council was "going great guns. We had
agencies really jumping and moving trying to do something about civil
rights ..... ,293
With the Council providing a steady focus for implementation of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, Johnson initially decided to limit his 1965 legislative
activity to passage of the numerous poverty programs he had submitted to
Congress.294 However, after seeing voting statistics from the 1964 election,
Johnson approved plans to strengthen the Democratic Party presented by
Louis Martin, Chair of the Democratic National Committee,295 that included
new voting rights legislation.296 In his January 1965 State of the Union ad-
dress, President Johnson pledged "that he would call on Congress to elimi-
nate 'all barriers to the right to vote."'
297
Not much work had been put into drafting a new bill when a series of
voting rights demonstrations in Selma, Alabama, led by Martin Luther
King, Jr., occurred.298 Alabama state troopers used "clubs, with horses, with
whips, and with tear gas" to quell a March 9 march from Selma to Mont-
gomery. 299 The extreme violence exhibited by state authorities in Selma,resulting in three deaths, was seen on television and shocked the nation.3°0
1965; July 2, 1965; July 12, 1965; July 16, 1965; July 16, 1965; July 23, 1965; Aug. 13,
1965) (on file with the Hubert H. Humphrey: Vice Presidential Files: Civil and Human
Rights Files, Box 826, Minnesota Historical Society) (copies on file with author).
292. Undated memorandum from Betsy (Costle) to Dave (Filvaroff) and Wiley [Bran-
ton], at 2. For example, in a talk at the Annual Convention of the National Association of
Intergroup Relations Officials on Oct. 20, 1965 at 7, Branton described the Council as "a
clearing house for ideas ... that could be put into action to facilitate the National commit-
ment [to civil rights]."
293. WAB 1969 Interview, supra note 31, at 61.
294. JOHN A. ANDREW, III, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE GREAT SOCIETY 34 (1998); see
also SALMOND, supra note 258, at 127 (suggesting that some part of Johnson's decision was
based on anger and pique at the popularity of Dr. Martin L. King, Jr.).
295. ANDREW, supra note 294, at 33-34.
296. Id. (noting that "[p]arty politics, perhaps more than civil rights, called the shots").
297. Loevy, supra note 212, at 335-36.
298. MICHAEL BESCHLOSS, REACHING FOR GLORY, LYNDON JOHNSON'S SECRET WHITE
HOUSE TAPES, 1964-1965 172 (2001); ANDREW, supra note 294, at 34.
299. WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 253.
300. QUIET REVOLUTION IN THE SOUTH, THE IMPACT OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 1965-
1990, supra note 246, at 30 (1994); BESCHLOSS, supra note 298, at 216 (noting the event
would be termed "Bloody Sunday"). "On Saturday, March 20, [Johnson] federalized 1,800
Alabama National Guardsmen and appointed Ramsey Clark to coordinate the march to
Montgomery." Id. at 236.
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The President soon announced that he would send a voting rights bill to
Congress.3 °1 Even Republicans were aroused. 0 2 Reaction to Selma from
both Congress and the public resulted in a swift "'consensus' on the provi-
sions of the bill .. .. 3
Once submitted, the Voting Rights Bill moved swiftly through Con-
gress. By August 6, it was ready for Johnson's signature. 304 The Voting
Rights Act of 1965 prohibited all the restrictions, standards, tests, and other
devices that had been used to prevent Blacks from voting in federal, state,
and local elections and gave federal officials the power to ensure that those
who wished to vote could do so. 30 5 The Act singled out those "states and
counties where fewer than fifty percent of all adults had gone to the polls in
1964 ...[and] authorized the attorney general to send federal examiners
into the South to enroll voters and observe registration practices. 30 6 The
Act also required officials in those selected counties to submit any changes
in their election procedures to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for approval
and authorized the DOJ to use litigation to challenge the "poll" tax in all
states.307 The only prerequisite for DOJ action was that "the attorney general
certif[y] to the U.S Civil Service Commission that voting rights violations
existed., 30 8 Once the Act was signed, the Justice Department moved quickly
to assign voting examiners to more than thirty counties in four states. 30 9
During this period Branton's VEP experience had become quite valu-
able and he was consulted by many of those planning for post-enactment
implementation.310 William L. Taylor of the United States Commission on
301. BESCHLOSS, supra note 298, at 171-72.
302. LAWSON, supra note 1, at 309 (stating "Senate Minority Leader Dirksen ... told
Katzenbach that he was prepared for a 'revolutionary' bill if necessary").
303. Loevy, supra note 212, at 337.
304. 111 Cong. Rec. 19649-19650 (1965). Branton was invited to attend the signing of
the Voting Rights Act [August 6, 1965] by President Johnson. Telegram from Lawrence F.
O'Brien, Special Assistant to the President, to Wiley Austin Branton (July 5, 1965) (on file
with author).
305. Paul Good, Odyssey of a Man-and a Movement, in BLACK PROTEST IN THE SIXTIES
272 (August Meier, John Bracey, Jr. and the late Elliott Rudwick, eds., 1991).
306. ALEXANDER KEYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE: THE CONTESTED HISTORY OF
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 263 (2000).
307. Id. at 264.
308. MANN, supra note 74, at 459-60.
309. KEYSSAR, supra note 306, at 264.
310. See, e.g., Memorandum from John Stewart to The Vice President (May 14, 1965)
(on file with Hubert H. Humphrey, Vice Presidential Files: Civil and Human Rights Files,
Box 826, Minnesota Historical Society). Vice President Humphrey urged John W. Macy, Jr.,
Chair of the U.S. Civil Service Commission, to work with Branton on Voting Rights Act
issues. Macy responded that he already was in communication with Branton. He noted "[w]e
are well aware of the wealth of knowledge and experience which Mr. Branton has gained in
the field of civil rights, and you may be sure that we will avail ourselves of the opportunity
of obtaining his counsel and advice on any problems which we may encounter in this field."
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Civil Rights even suggested to President Johnson that the Council was the
appropriate agency to coordinate and implement programs to disseminate
voting information and provide voter education as an aid to implementing
the Act.3 11 These activities put Branton right in the middle of the federal
government's latest civil rights action. By the end of September, however,
there were major changes.
Apparently, President Johnson had become more and more dissatisfied
with Humphrey's involvement in civil rights. Some observers suggested
that he resented anyone but himself getting credit for civil rights suc-
cesses.312 Others believed that Humphrey's disagreement with Johnson on
Vietnam created a gulf between the two. 3 13 As early as May 14, Johnson
complained about "leaks" to the press that he blamed on Humphrey and told
his aides that Humphrey was not to do anything without White House in-
structions.314
Humphrey was not oblivious to the cold shoulder he was getting from
the President's office. Toward the end of August 1965, Humphrey com-
plained that some of the Council's efforts were being duplicated and up-
staged by activities of the President's staff, although he blamed the prob-
lems on "inadequate communication ... between the White House staff and
the Council" rather than on the President.315
Whatever the cause, by August, Johnson had asked his aide, Joseph
Califano, Jr., and Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach to "recommend a
more effective way to organize the government's civil rights efforts. 316
Without Humphrey's knowledge, an entirely new approach was conceived.
The plan totally eliminated the Vice President's involvement in civil rights
and put Katzenbach in charge of the government's efforts.317 Individual
departments and agencies were given responsibility for "programs within
their jurisdiction., 31 8 In other words, things were back where they had been
Letter from John W. Macy, Jr., Chair, U.S. Civil Service Commission, to The Vice President,
United States Senate (Sept. 8, 1965) (on file with author).
311. Memorandum from Taylor to Lee C. White, Special Counsel to the President (Aug.
27, 1965) (on file with author)
312. JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., THE TRIUMPH & TRAGEDY OF LYNDON JOHNSON, THE
WHITE HOUSE YEARS 65 (1991); MANN, supra note 74, at 484.
313. CARL SOLBERG, HUBERT HUMPHREY: A BIOGRAPHY 271 (1984).
314. BESCHLOSS, supra note 298, at 322.
315. Memorandum from The Vice President to Marvin Watson (Aug. 26, 1965) (on file
with the Hubert H. Humphrey: Vice Presidential Files: Civil and Human Rights Files, Box
826, Minnesota Historical Society).
316. CALIFANO, supra note 312, at 65. Journalist Nicholas Lamann suggests that Bran-
ton's presence as director made the Council more high-profile than Johnson liked. Lamann,
supra note 262, at § 6, p. 36, Col. 1.
317. CALIFANO, supra note 312, at 66.
318. Id. at 66; see also Attachment to Memorandum from Marvin Watson to The Presi-
dent (Sept. 20, 1965) (on file with the WHCF, Ex FG731, file: President's Committee on
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at the beginning of the year. On September 22 Humphrey was invited to a
meeting and sandbagged with the proposed changes.31 9
On September 24 President Johnson announced the government's civil
rights reorganization that included abolishing the President's Council on
Equal Opportunity.320 Reaction was negative. Humphrey had a long record
of innovative civil rights activism, while Katzenbach was known to "pursue
a methodical, legalistic approach., 321 The Attorney General did not seem
the best choice for advancing enforcement of civil rights laws. Newspaper
reports noted that civil rights groups believed the change presaged a lessen-
ing of governmental effort.322
In its short life, the President's Council apparently had only two full
meetings, on March 3, 1965 and May 19, 1965.323 This was a deliberate
decision, as Humphrey felt that the work could be performed most effi-
ciently at lower levels of Council management by acting as "watchdog, ca-
joler, coordinator, and advisor on most major civil rights decisions and pro-
grams of the government. 3 24 The Council's staff members all had diverse
experience relevant to promotion of a civil rights agenda and could move
quickly to assure changes in the operations of a federal agency.325 As noted
earlier, Branton's position was key to the communication efforts.
The Council's elimination might have left Branton stranded, particu-
larly in the aftermath of a miscommunication that put him unfavorably in
the national headlines.326 The incident died down quickly, but Branton was
Equal Employment Opportunity 1/1/65-," Box 403, LBJ Library).
319. CALIFANO, supra note 312, at 66-67.
320. Rights Units Are Shuffled, WASH., D.C. EVENING STAR, Sept. 24, 1965.
321. See, e.g., Steven F. Lawson, Civil Rights in EXPLORING THE JOHNSON YEARS 113
(Robert A. Divine, ed., 1981) (noting "the subsequent enforcement arrangement devised by
Johnson, Califano, and other White House and Justice Department officials was far from
exemplary"), see e.g.; MANN, supra note 74, at 485. Other entities were orphaned. Id. (com-
menting that "the President's Committee for Equal Opportunity in Housing, the Community
Relations Service, and the U.S. Civil Rights Commission all fell into various states of disuse
or outright irrelevance").
322. Rights Groups Fear Easing of U.S. Enforcement Role, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1965
(stating that some of those to whom civil rights responsibilities devolved learned of the
changes only minutes before they were announced).
323. Memorandum from Betsy (Costle), to Dave (Filvaroff) and Wiley [Branton] 3
(1965) (on file with author).
324. Id. at 4.
325. Id.
326. Only a day before the President's September 22 meeting with Humphrey, there was
an informal dinner meeting aboard the presidential yacht, "Honey Fitz," attended by Hum-
phrey and many civil rights leaders. Larry Still, Humphrey Sees Rights Leaders Aboard
Yacht, WASH., D.C. EVENING STAR, Sept. 23, 1965 (stating that it allowed an "'off the re-
cord' discussion on civil rights problems in a relaxed atmosphere"). Those attending in-
cluded the Vice President, Branton, and other staff from the Council; the Rev. Martin Luther
King, Jr., and Andrew Young (SCLC); Jack Greenberg (NAACP Legal Defense and Educa-
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hurt by the accusations. 327 However, the negative headlines did not affect
his prestige or value in the administration's eyes. Attorney General Katzen-
bach had concluded a September 20 memo to President Johnson with the
statements: "If the Equal Opportunity Council is terminated ... [t]his could
cause a political problem unless another important assignment is found for
Wiley Branton." 32 8 Johnson apparently agreed. On September 24, two days
after he informed Humphrey that the Council would be abolished, and the
same day he signed Executive Order 11246 transferring civil rights respon-
sibilities to various government entities,329 Johnson met with Wiley Branton
in the White House. 330 Later that day, Johnson announced that Branton
would move over to the DOJ as a Special Assistant to the Attorney Gen-
eral.33'
In his position with the Council, Branton had acted as a facilitator,
conduit, and promoter for the Johnson administration. The credibility he had
developed with Black Americans throughout his career and, particularly,
with the VEP, gave luster to his statements about what President Johnson
was doing with civil rights. Katzenbach's anticipation that firing Branton
tion Fund); Clarence Mitchell (NAACP's D.C. office); Whitney Young, Jr. (National Urban
League); Stephen Currier (Taconic Foundation); Rev. Walter Fauntroy and Floyd McKissick
(SNCC); Louis Martin (National Democratic Committee); and Lloyd Garrison (civil rights
attorney). List, "Persons Who Have Been Invited To Meet With The Vice President on the
Honey Fitz on September 21, 1965, from 7:00 PM to 9:00 PM" (Sept. 21, 1965) (on file with
author).
A "frank" discussion became heated. Branton later was accused in print of having
said that the civil rights organizations were not helping the voter registration situation by
their complaints. Humphrey's Negro Aide Hits Rights Agitation, Irks Leaders, JET, Oct. 7,
1965, at 8-10 (stating that Branton said "Negroes should be thankful and grateful for the
extraordinary gains of the Johnson administration... [and] should take stock of the advances
and solidify them rather than continue agitation."). The controversy generated a letter deny-
ing the accusations and clarifying Branton's remarks from some attendees to John H. John-
son, editor and publisher of JET Magazine. Letter from Whitney M. Young, Jr., Jack Green-
berg, Floyd B. McKissick, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Stephen R. Currier to John H. John-
son (Oct. 4, 1965) (on file with author).
327. In a note to a friend, he referred to a story about the incident in the October 7 issue
of JET magazine, denied the statements attributed to him, and called it an "attempt to dis-
credit [him] . . ." Letter from Wiley Austin Branton to Dr. Geraldine E. Wood, President,
Delta Sigma Theta Sorority, Wash. D.C. (Sept. 30, 1965) (on file with author). Branton's
files contain many similar letters written during this period. He took every opportunity to
"clear his name" with other blacks and clearly saw the negative statements as part of the
perennial competition within the civil rights movement.
328. Attachment to memorandum from Marvin Watson, to The President 4 (Sept. 20,
1965) (on file with the WHCF, Ex FG731 file: President's Committee on Equal Employment
Opportunity 1/1/65-_," Box 403, LBJ Library).
329. Lamann, supra note 262, at § 6, at 36, Col. 1.
330. Papers of LBJ, President, 1963-1969, The President's Daily Diary, 5/1/65-9/30/65,
Box 4, LBJ Library.
331. Robert E. Baker, Branton to Step Up Vote Pace, WASH. POST, Sept. 25, 1965.
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would be a bad move for the administration probably was accurate. Bran-
ton's name recognition and reputation remained strong with Blacks across
the South. In less than five months, he had enhanced his skills in a new
arena. The intermediary role he played within the Council gave him an in-
timate understanding of the inner workings of government departments and
introduced him to many of the people who performed that work.
Branton was ambivalent about remaining with the government.332 He
was "reported to be willing to try the Justice Department job and see if he is
permitted to put some of his ideas into effect. 333 Branton knew from his
VEP experience that the DOJ's civil rights approach was a far cry from his
own ideas about what was needed.
V. SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, 1965-1967
When President Johnson appointed Wiley Branton as Special Assistant
to Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach on September 24, 1965, it was a
quick way out of a dilemma. Branton was too well-known among a con-
stituency that Johnson had courted assiduously simply to fire him after the
President's Council was abolished. Yet the reorganization of civil rights
responsibilities left no obvious place for Branton. 334 Johnson told the media
that Branton would focus on voting rights, conducting a "'full and vigorous
and swift' program of voter registration for Negroes in the South. 3 35
The day after the announcement of Branton's transfer to the DOJ,
White House Press Secretary Bill D. Moyers was quoted as saying "[t]he
332. Letter from Wiley Austin Branton to R.A. (Reggie) Eilbott, Jr., Esq, Reinberger,
Eilbott, Smith and Staten (Sept. 30, 1965) (on file with author) (stating, "I have not physi-
cally moved to the Department of Justice yet, as I want to take a good, long, hard look at
everything involved before making that move and this includes some serious consideration as
to whether or not I want to return to the active practice of law which I am really beginning to
miss.").
333. Rights Groups Fear Easing of US. Enforcement Role, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 1965.
334. An "after-the-fact" job description makes it seem that Branton alone would carry on
the work of the Council. It stated the appointee:
would "provide assistance to the Federal departments and agencies in coordinat-
ing their program and activities ... with respect to enforcement of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Coordinates special working or study groups estab-
lished among the Federal departments and agencies. Ensures that such groups
are aware of the scope and the policy considerations surrounding their work and
provides guidance in resolving problems encountered by such groups."
Fact Sheet on Non-Presidential-Appointive Policy and Supporting Positions, Dec. 23, 1965
(on file with the WHCF, Office Files of John Macy, file: "Branton, Wiley A.," Box 58, LBJ
Library).
335. Bias Roles Shift, WASH. DAILY NEWS, Sept. 24, 1965; Rights Units Are Shuffled,
WASH. EVENING STAR, Sept. 24, 1965.
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President told Branton that he considered voter registration 'the paramount
concern of the Federal Government at the present time."', 336 It is likely that
Branton's transfer to Katzenbach's bailiwick was intended to avoid charges
that the President was slowing down on civil rights efforts. 7
Despite the grandiose descriptions of Branton's new responsibilities, it
never was made any more clear just what he would do and how he was to
perform. Others, too, were uncertain about how Branton's experience and
ideas would be used in the DOJ. Newspaper reports commented that Bran-
ton's philosophy as to the government's role in assuring voting rights dif-
fered significantly from that of Katzenbach with regard to federal interven-
338 blee ation. Branton believed that federal intervention was appropriate, while
Katzenbach believed in federal restraint.
In August Branton had said "[t]he government encourages people to
drive safely and do other things all the time. There is nothing improper
about encouraging [them] to vote and aiming the encouragement toward
areas where large numbers are not registered., 339 Katzenbach, on the other
hand, believed that local community efforts, rather than "exertions of the
federal government," were the answer and that federal "examiners ... were
not the crucial factor." 
340
Civil rights leaders were said to be "cautiously optimistic" about the
changes.341 On the other hand, Whitney Young decried President Johnson's
decision to abolish the Council on Equal Opportunity and showed skepti-
cism of the notion that DOJ and the individual agencies that were dividing
responsibility for civil rights would continue the kind of pressure that had
336. Carrol Kilpatrick, Federal Rights Setup Revamped by President, WASH. POST, Sept.
25, 1965.
337. John Herbes, Rights Groups Fear Easing of U.S. Enforcement Role, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 17, 1965 (noting that the appointment came "after several weeks of criticism by civil
rights leaders that Negroes are still being blocked from registering in many counties in the
South and that the Justice Department is moving too slowly").
338. Id.
339. Branton Says Job Is to Encourage Negroes in South to Register to Vote, ARK.
GAZETTE, Aug. 26, 1965; Using the Registrars, WASH. STAR, Oct. 9, 1965 (stating that Bran-
ton was "armed with presidential instructions to conduct a full, vigorous and swift campaign
to get every eligible person, including the illiterates, registered and ready to vote").
340. WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 265-66.
A study later in the year by the second VEP produced findings that differed from
the Attorney General's. Registration results were best, it said, in counties which
had both an organized voter registration drive in action and federal examiners.
They were second best in counties with examiners alone, third in counties with a
drive alone, and worst, of course, in counties with neither.
Id. (citing The Effects of Federal Examiners and Organized Registration Campaigns on Ne-
gro Voter Registration, A Special Report of the Voter Education Project of the Southern
Regional Council, July 1966).




been exhibited by Vice President Humphrey and the Council.34 2 An Afri-
can-American newspaper editorial commented that communication between
President Johnson and Attorney General Katzenbach would need clarifica-
tion before Branton would be able to do what President Johnson said he was
to do.343 Others were suspicious of Johnson's motives, believing he had
caved in to Congressional racists and economic conservatives and that the
dilution of responsibility would dissolve the cohesiveness of the Executive's
civil rights work. 344 The Arkansas Gazette soon reported that the Attorney
General had rejected Branton's proposal for a federal registration drive,345 a
charge refuted by Branton in a letter to the editor.346
Working against both Branton and Johnson at this time were changes
occurring in Black attitudes toward the government and white society, par-
ticularly among the young. 347 These changes may have been a result of the
movement's successes, 348 or come out of the disillusionment and outrage
that followed the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party's abortive efforts
to have its delegates seated at the National Convention in Atlantic City.349
John Lewis saw the experiences of thousands of young men and women
during the 1964 Freedom Summer in Mississippi as catalysts for "a crisis of
spirit [and] faith in the fundamental promises and premises of the American
system . . . .. 350 He blamed the Atlantic City controversy for creating a
deep mistrust of the value of traditional politics in the struggle for equal-
342. Whitney Young, To Be Equal: LBJs agency switch examined," THE AFRO-
AMERICAN, Nov. 2, 1965 (citing Katzenbach's statements that he hoped the switch would
reduce the number of suits and increase conciliation efforts as evidence that such pressure
would not continue).
343. Puzzler For Katzenbach, THE AFRO-AMERICAN, Oct. 19, 1965.
344. Christopher Pyle & Richard Morgan, Johnson's Civil Rights Shake Up, THE NEW
LEADER, Oct. 11, 1965, at 3 (commenting that the moves gave Congress the right to inspect
budgets and control the expenses of equal employment opportunity investigations); see also
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, The Cautions Reconstruction, WASH. POST, Oct. 28,
1965 (blaming Katzenbach's cautious implementation style for increasing suspicions of the
civil rights groups).
345. Testing the Voting Law, ARK. GAZETrE, Oct. 23, 1965.
346. Wiley A. Branton, The Negro Vote, ARK. GAZETTE, Oct. 23, 1965, at Letters to the
Editor.
347. See, e.g., WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 255-57 (describing conflicts
behind the scenes of the Selma demonstrations in February and March 1965); id. at 271
(reporting "visible inter-organizational rivalry, and the first public display of racist tenden-
cies in the radical wing of the movement-the 'black power' debate"); MEIER & RUDWICK,
supra note 4, at 329.
348. LAWSON, supra note 145, at 117 (1991) (citing the dignity "restored" during the
success of the Montgomery, Alabama, bus boycott).
349. Id. (assigning the blame to "[t]he failure of the federal government to protect civil
rights workers and the willingness of liberal whites to compromise the Mississippi Freedom
Democratic Party's convention challenge in 1964").
350. LEWIS & D'ORso, supra note 4, at 282.
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ity. 351 Sheer exhaustion, with little real prospect of relief, may have embit-
tered many of the civil rights workers.352
Whether or not there was a specific event that turned away supporters
or merely a clash between rising expectations and the slow progress of leg-
islative implementation, as some others have said,353 the civil rights arena
was changing at the time Branton joined the DOJ. Soon, the accumulating
number of riots in the Black ghettos would turn Congress, and a large part
of society, against additional government efforts in civil rights.354 As of
September 1965, however, no one anticipated such a turn of events.
Once relieved of all Council obligations, Branton focused on his new
job. In a memorandum dated November 16, he reminded Katzenbach that
his Council duties would end on the 19th "and I will then be available full-
time to assist you in whatever duties you see fit to assign me., 355 Branton
continued, "I would appreciate word from you about this as soon as it is
convenient for you to let me know what your plans are." 35 6 As far as can be
determined, Branton never was given specific responsibilities. Rather, it
appears that he attempted to "fit in" to the existing program in his own
way. 357 This awkward situation was apparent to some outsiders. 358 As Bran-
351. Id. at291.
352. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 4, at 277-78 (describing a eulogy by David Dennis
at the funeral of James Chaney that began with the words "I'm sick and tired of going to the
funerals of black men who have been murdered by white men").
353. See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 321, at 116 (1981). Lawson quotes presidential aide
Harry McPherson as saying, "[w]e thought that if we could be a sort of super YMCA saying
'You can go to school with us, we'll educate you, train you, will get better housing' and all
that sort of stuff. But we haven't really fixed it at the base which is money, security, families
holding together, some power that is given to them by money." Id. at 116-17. At least one of
Johnson's aides believed that the President anticipated this would happen. CALIFANO, supra
note 311, at 11 (stating "[Johnson] was always in a hurry because he feared that once black
Americans sensed the prospect of a better life, their acceptance of discrimination would turn
to impatience and dissatisfaction with progress however real, and they would subvert their
own cause.").
354. Riots began occurring in 1965 and became a constant concern for Johnson. "Al-
though the administration tried to defuse potential trouble spots before they exploded and to
keep the lines of communication open, presidential advisers admitted that 'a lot of this is
essentially uncontrollable. It will happen no matter what the federal government does."' THE
JOHNSON YEARS, VOLUME THREE, LBJ AT HOME AND ABROAD 97 (Robert A. Devine, ed.
1994); see also infra notes 404-07 and accompanying text.
355. Memorandum from Wiley Austin Branton, to The Attorney General, (Nov. 16,
1965).
356. Id.
357. WAB 1970 Interview, supra note 23, at 45 (commenting that he had Katzenbach's
approval for his decision to focus on voting rights issues).
358. See, e.g., Rights Coalition-Fractions, Fragmented, WASH. POST, Jan. 16, 1967
(analyzing the state of the civil rights movement and noting that, after elimination of the
President's Council "its energetic Negro director, Wiley Branton, was also dispatched to a
quiet office in Justice, . . . [where] telephone operators didn't have his extension for a while
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ton later described it, his "operations were primarily of a lone wolf nature;
in that while I was technically in the Civil Rights Division, I was not of the
Civil Rights Division."
359
Soon Branton was performing similar functions to those he had had
with the Council. Instead of reporting to the Vice President, he reported to
Attorney General Katzenbach. He quickly began the first of numerous
speaking engagements and visits to communities across the country.360
There were complaints about the DOJ's slow action on enforcing the Voting
Rights Act; Branton attempted to convey the facts. 361 During speaking en-
gagements, he charted the government's progress in implementing both the
1964 and 1965 Acts and gathered feedback on how government action was
being received locally.362 He acted as liaison between the DOJ and the
Leadership Conference on Civil Rights363 and individual civil rights organi-
zations. 364 He also continued a relationship as informal counsel for the
and [] he has been given little to do").
359. WAB 1969 Interview, supra note 31, at 63 (emphasis added).
360. US. Official Defends Voting Act Enforcement, THE WASHINGTON, DC, EVENING
STAR, Nov. 1, 1965 (describing Branton's speech at the Virginia state conference of the
NAACP in Roanoke, Virginia). On December 14, 1965, Branton spoke before YWCA lead-
ers in Atlanta. Letter from Martha Reines (for Miss Dorothy Height) to Wiley Austin Bran-
ton (Dec. 10, 1965). On December 28 he spoke to the Boston chapter of Kappa Alpha Psi
Fraternity in Boston. Letter from Elmer W. Henderson to Wiley Austin Branton (Dec. 22,
1965).
361. When Branton joined the DOJ, nineteen counties in Mississippi, Alabama and Lou-
isiana had been assigned federal registrars by the Justice Department under the Voting Rights
Act. Rights Units Are Shuffled, WASH. EVENING STAR, Nov. 24, 1965. However, those states
were refusing to add the lists of names registered by the federal employees to the official
state voter lists. Testing the Voting Law, ARK. GAZEIrE, Oct. 23, 1965. The DOJ had gone to
the United States Supreme Court for an expedited ruling on the Act's constitutionality and
that had slowed the assignment of additional registrars. Id.
362. Wiley A. Branton, My Responsibilities in the Area of Civil Rights (stating, "I travel
through the south frequently where I confer with local Negro leaders on voter registration
problems and civil rights generally. I consult with and advise the Attorney General on mat-
ters dealing with the implementation of the Voting Rights Act and [convey to] the Civil
Rights Division any civil rights problems brought to my attention through my travels or
contracts.")
For example, in November, Branton said that "every Negro should sleep a little
better every night because Lyndon Johnson is in the White House" and that the President
intended to "see that every eligible person has every opportunity to vote." U.S. Official De-
fends Voting Act Enforcement, WASH. EVENING STAR, Nov. 1, 1965.
363. Branton worked with the Leadership Conference to perform a survey on the effec-
tiveness of the Voting Rights Act in 1966. Letter from J. Francis Pohlhaus, Special Consult-
ant; Roy Wilkins, Chair; and Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., Counsel, to Wiley Austin Branton (July 15,
1966).
364. Branton wrote to CORE, suggesting that its next Legal Conference put "Civil Rights
Uses of Anti-poverty Legal Programs" at the top of its list. Letter from Wiley Austin Branton
to Carl Rachlin, Esq., General Counsel, CORE Legal Department (Oct. 25, 1965) (noting
that he "detect[s] a growing concern and interest . . . with reference to the manner in which
2004]
UALR LAW REVIEW
Southern Regional Council's second VEP, headed by Vernon Jordan.3 65
When Black leaders in Mobile, Alabama, threatened to "go fishing" rather
than vote in the next election, Branton traveled with the Attorney General to
Mobile, where Katzenbach promised increased voter registration efforts,
more examiners where necessary, and swift, sure federal action against in-
timidation and terror.
3 66
Within the office, Branton "would raise hell about things, trying to
prod people to make decisions or to send in examiners or observers, or this,
that and the other. Sometimes I won my point; sometimes, I didn't.
367
Branton continued to act as an intermediary for ordinary citizens, receiving
individual requests for help with discrimination problems and channeling
them to the persons and departments that might be able to help.368 More
than most of the Blacks with whom the Attorney General had contact, Bran-
ton knew what was going on in the South. That knowledge allowed him to
act as a screen for speaking requests to the Attorney General, as he had for
Vice President Humphrey. Branton could, as he did on April 21, 1966, warn
Katzenbach against accepting an invitation to speak that would put him in
the middle of a local political quagmire.369
their local anti-poverty programs are being operated"). Id.
365. Letter from Wiley Austin Branton to Vernon Jordan, Jr. (Feb. 23, 1966) (in response
to Jordan's letters of Jan. 25, 1966 (attached) asking for comments on draft guidelines for
agencies anticipating grants).
366. Larry A. Still, Katzenbach Finds Problems, WASH. STAR, Jan. 4, 1966 (noting that
the state NAACP president was pressured by the national office to attend the meeting, after
he called the trip an effort to cover up "lack of enforcement of the Voting Rights Act while
seeking voluntary compliance by reluctant local officials."); WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra
note 139, at 265. Branton was the only Black aide in Katzenbach's entourage and, because of
his light skin, was mistakenly listed as white by some news reports. Charles McWilliams,
Katzenbach And Gallalee Views Clash, THE MOBILE REGISTER, Jan. 4, 1965, at 1, 7.
367. WAB 1969 Interview, supra note 31, at 64.
368. See, e.g., letter from James C. Evans, to Wiley Austin Branton (Dec. 10, 1965), and
from James C. Evans to Wiley Austin Branton (Dec. 21, 1965); letter from Wiley Austin
Branton, to James C. Evans, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Jan. 5, 1966)
(concerning violence against Negro military personnel); letters from M.F. Jackson, Jr., to
Wiley Austin Branton (Mar. 24, 1966), and letter from Wiley Austin Branton, to M.F. Jack-
son, Jr. (Mar. 29, 1966) (concerning Georgia registrar's use of different colored registration
cards for Blacks and whites); letter from Beth Livezey, to Wiley Austin Branton (Apr. 18,
1966) (enclosing copy of letter dated Apr. 1, 1966, from the Citizen Improvement League,
Voter's League of Etowah County, Alabama, to Mrs. Frank Moon, Chairman, Board of
Registrars; letter from Wiley Austin Branton, to Beth Livezey (Apr. 21, 1966) (regarding
Alabama registrar's limited hours and decision that those registered in February and March
1966 would not be eligible to vote until February 1967)); letter from Lacy J. Kennedy, to Mr.
A.L. Whitten, Superintendent, Marianna Public Schools, copy to Wiley Austin Branton (May
24, 1966) (asking reconsideration of his refusal to transfer her daughter from a segregated to
a white high school and threatening legal action if the transfer again was denied).
369. Memorandum from Wiley Austin Branton to James F. Flug, DOJ (Apr. 21, 1966).
Attached to the memo were three drafts of a letter refusing an invitation to speak in Duval
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In a May 1966 interview in Little Rock, Branton described the job as
"work[ing] ... as a sort of liaison between the Justice Department and pri-
vate groups and other government agencies in an effort to assist in the im-
plementation of the Voting Rights Act., 370 When the first of the southern
primaries occurred in Alabama, Branton was an observer of the poll condi-
tions facing Black voters. 371 He was optimistic about the elections, as is
indicated by his joking, when asked about voting conditions in Arkansas, "I
know Arkansas, I don't think we're going to have any problems about voter
registration. We may have problems on the honesty of elections, but I
wouldn't regard it as a racial matter." 372 He also produced a conference on
the Voting Rights Act in May, inviting local voter registration activists
across the South to learn from attorneys in the Civil Rights Division about
the intricacies of the Act.
3 73
Branton's time inside the DOJ also may have caused him to rethink the
quality of the federal government's actions in support of civil rights. He
commented as early as February 1966 that the federal government was do-
ing what it should with regard to supporting Negro registration efforts, al-
though he had not thought so earlier.374 A news article noted that Branton
"spends most of his time traveling in the South, checking into motels, intro-
ducing himself to local Negro leaders and asking them what they are doing
to interest Negroes in registering to vote. 375
Whether Branton was convinced of Katzenbach's position or not, he
was a loyal employee. In March 1966, he objected to an article stating that
he disagreed with the DOJ's methods of implementing the voting rights law
and had unsuccessfully demanded change.376 Instead, he said:
I subscribe to the basic policy which the Department of Justice follows
in implementing this program. I would be naive if I said that I agree with
everything that was done at all times; however, I would consider it a
breach of ethics to be critical in public of an agency which I work with. I
have found Attorney General Katzenbach to be very cooperative in con-
County (Fla.). The one that appears to have been used was the most formal.
370. Alabama to Let Negroes Vote, Branton Feels, ARK. GAZETrE, May 1, 1966.
371. Id. (commenting that he thought "for the most part [Negroes] will be allowed to
vote").
372. Id.
373. Memorandum from John Doar, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division,
to Mr. Pollak, Mr. Owen, Mr. Hubbard, Mr. Dunbaugh, Mr. Jones, Mr. Ross, and Mr. Gabel
(May 13, 1966).
374. Robert E. Baker, Branton Is Veteran Of Rights Struggles, WASH. POST, Feb. 7,
1966, at A2 (concluding "'Overall,' he said, 'things are moving well. In the spring, I expect a
great turnout of Negroes to register in the South. . . .You can already see the changes
there."').
375. Id.
376. Letter from Wiley Austin Branton, to Editor, S. COURIER (Mar. 3, 1966).
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sidering any recommendations which I make to him regarding the voting
rights program.377
In fact, however, Branton was an anomaly within the DOJ. He did not
fit into the Department's hierarchy and lines of authority. His experience
and background far exceeded that of the usual young Assistant United
States Attorney who performed ordinary legal duties within the department.
Former Attorney General Ramsey Clark believes that Branton's background
would have made him a viable candidate for the Attorney General's job, or
as a Deputy Attorney General, but all those positions were taken at the
time.3 8 Wiley Branton had detailed knowledge about civil rights activities
in the South, both its people and communities, that was valuable at the
higher levels of the DOJ where strategic decisions were made. As a special
assistant, he had a certain access to power, but lacked the type of real au-
thority he had exercised at the VEP or even on the President's Council.
Branton could point out to government officials where matters needed
attention, but he could not order any action. His frustration was apparent
even years later when he told an interviewer that he had "recommended
time and again that action be taken" without result.379 To another inter-
viewer, Branton acknowledged that his relations within the DOJ were
strained, ascribing it to the fact that his presence had been thrust upon
Katzenbach.38°
When Katzenbach was appointed Undersecretary of State in September
1966,381 Wiley Branton viewed it as an opportunity to leave the Justice De-
partment. On October 3, 1966 he wrote to President Johnson's aide, Joseph
Califano, stating that he believed his job for the President was completed.382
Branton noted that the President had requested such notice and asked that
Califano call him to discuss what would happen next.383 Branton was satis-
fied with what he had done, "I think that my efforts have contributed to a lot
of the registration . , although I realize that there are still thousands of
unregistered people in the South. 384
377. Id.
378. Interview with Ramsey Clark II (April 13, 2004) (transcript and tape on file with
author).
379. WAB 1970 Interview, supra note 23, at 47.
380. WAB 1969 Interview, supra note 31, at 65.
381. Interview with Ramsey Clark 6 (April 13, 2004) (transcript and tape on file with
author).
382. Memorandum from Wiley Austin Branton, to Joseph A. Califano, Special Assistant
to the President (Oct. 31, 1966) (commenting, "I feel I have made most of the suggestions





In turn, Califano sent a memorandum to President Johnson on Novem-
ber 8.385 After reminding Johnson that Branton had been appointed to the
DOJ because the President had wanted someone in the Attorney General's
office "devoted solely to voter registration," Califano described Branton's
belief that his usefulness to the Justice Department was ended.38 6 Califano
noted that Katzenbach and Ramsey Clark, the Assistant Attorney General,
both felt that Branton had done well and had continued usefulness "in the
right slot. ' 387 Califano forestalled any suspicion that Branton's resignation
was a ploy for advancement. Rather, he stated "[i]f Branton is not so used,
he would probably return to private practice in Georgia, . . . without any
bitterness., 388 President Johnson responded that Califano should explore job
possibilities for Branton.
389
There is no indication of precisely what ensued following these ex-
changes. Branton did meet with Ramsey Clark, who became Acting Attor-
ney General, on October 10.390 Given Branton's character and his personal
investment in civil rights, he may have been intrigued by Clark's plans to
appoint more federal registrars and to move more aggressively in civil rights
than had Katzenbach.391 Vice President Humphrey wrote to Branton on De-
cember 2, stating that there was still much to do in civil rights and that
[Branton's] knowledge and contacts were too valuable to lose.392 A plea to
"duty" from the Vice President when they met on December 14 also was
likely to have been successful.393 In any event, Branton remained with the
DOJ for another year, working in the same capacity for the new Attorney
General, Ramsey Clark.
385. Memorandum from Califano, to The President (Nov. 8, 1966) (WHCF Name File,
BRANTLEYA, Box 428, LBJ Library).
386. Id. (continuing that Louis Martin said Branton was interested in a judgeship or some
other government post "that will challenge him...").
387. Id. (noting that they suggested Branton be appointed to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission or as its general counsel).
388. Id.
389. Id. (containing LBJ's handwritten response).
390. Wiley Austin Branton 1966 Calendar (Dec. 10, 1966) (photocopy of page in au-
thor's possession).
391. Interview with Ramsey Clark 7 (Apr. 13, 2004). Clark's opinions were closer to
those held by Branton, and offered a chance to do more effective voting rights work.
392. Letter from Hubert H. Humphrey, to Wiley Austin Branton (Dec. 2, 1966) (stating
"[n]ot knowing what your plans are for the future, may I ask that, before you make any defi-
nite plans, we have the chance to visit"). In a memorandum to one of his aides, Humphrey
wrote "Wiley is an important figure. We should not let him leave Washington. There must be
a place found for him worthy of his talents .... I want to keep Wiley in our set-up." Memo-
randum from the Vice President, to Bill Welsh (Dec. 2, 1966) (noting that he had heard
Branton was "a bit unhappy" at the DOJ).
393. Wiley Austin Branton 1966 Calendar (Dec. 14, 1966).
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As far as can be determined by his correspondence, Branton's activi-
ties did not change in 1967. He continued to speak to groups about the gov-
ernment's efforts at securing voting rights and in developing social pro-
grams that would make those rights more meaningful.394 He continued to
represent the government at local strategy sessions on continuing voter reg-
istration efforts,39 5 and he continued to act as intermediary between local
activists and the federal government.396 Branton was one of a group of gov-
ernment employees and private individuals who met in May and June 1967
with Attorney General Ramsey Clark to exchange updates on what the gov-
ernment was doing in civil rights and to strategize about legislative action
on proposed "Great Society" bills. 397 Clark believes that Branton's contribu-
tion to those sessions was invaluable. 398 Branton's reputation with Black
leaders continued to reflect positively on the administration. On June 2,
1967, when President Johnson met with Black elected officials attending a
Democratic conference in Washington,399 Branton was among those pre-
sent.4"0
Wiley Branton wrote another letter directly to President Johnson on
October 12, 1967 stating that he had completed all his assignments with the
Justice Department. 40 1 Forestalling any further efforts to keep him with the
administration, his letter also announced that he was leaving to become Ex-
ecutive Director of the United Planning Organization of the District of Co-
lumbia as of October 20.402 The President invited him to the White House
"for a thank you for a job well done" on October 18, 1967.403
394. In a speech to the National Newspaper Publishers Association on January 12, 1967,
Branton highlighted the effect that an increased numbers of Black voters in the southern
states had had on the 1966 elections, and said "this year of 1967 promises to be an extremely
exciting year in ... Mississippi and Louisiana, [where] you will have all of your local elec-
tions.., from the governor on down." Wiley A. Branton, speech at the 27th Annual Midwin-
ter Workshop of the National Newspaper Publishers Association 10 (Jan. 12, 1967).
395. Letter from Vernon E. Jordan, Jr., to Wiley Austin Branton (Feb. 13, 1967) (con-
firming his attendance at a meeting of VEP staff and field consultants).
396. See, e.g., exchange of letters between Wiley Austin Branton and Emmett A. Mays,
Jr., Shreveport, Louisiana (June 26, 1967 and June 30, 1967) (concerning difficulties Mays
was having with white officials in establishing an OEO Headstart Program and Branton's
intervention with the OEO head office).
397. Memoranda Ramsey Clark (May 26, 1967; Apr. 20, 1967; June 23, 1967) (Box 63,
file "Civil Rights Leadership-Meetings," LBJ Library).
398. Interview with Ramsey Clark 8, 9, 12 (Apr. 13, 2004).
399. WHCF, The President's Daily Diary, 4/16/67-6/30/67, Box 11; WHCF, The Presi-
dent's Appointment File [Diary Backup], 6/1/67-6/7/67, Box 67, LBJ Library.
400. "White House supplemental list," WHCF, The President's Appointment File [Diary
Backup], 6/1/67-6/7/67, Box 67, LBJ Library.
401. Letter from Wiley Austin Branton to The President (Oct. 12, 1967) (WHCF Name
File, BRANTLEYA, Box 428, LBJ Library).
402. Id. In fact, Branton used his accumulated leave time to begin his UPO work on
October 16, 1967. Letter from Wiley Austin Branton, to Hon. Warren Christopher, Deputy
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By the time Branton left government service, the tenor of civil rights
activism had changed dramatically.40 4 The murmurings of 1965 had hard-
ened into the alienation of many young Blacks from the rest of society and
had resulted in the rise of the "Black Power" movement and riots in com-
munities across the country.40 5 The traditional civil rights leaders were help-
less. When President Johnson met with Roy Wilkins and Whitney Young in
1967 to warn that negative congressional reactions to riots were bad news
for new legislation, "[t]he two moderate black leaders seemed at a loss.
Young said they were concerned about 'the whole pattern,. . .' and that they
could not control the 'young people."4A
6
For Johnson and the civil rights elders and Branton, the vote and legis-
lative processes had long been the means by which a repressed group would
take its place with others in society.40 7 They did not know how to respond to
Attorney General (Oct. 6, 1967). Perhaps to forestall additional importunings from federal
officials and making it impossible to remain with the DOJ, Branton had begun communicat-
ing with those who would select the UPO's director in August. Letter from Wiley Austin
Branton, to Frederick B. Lee, Vice President, Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp. (Aug. 28,
1967) (attaching copy of Wiley Austin Branton's resume).
403. WHCF, The President's Daily Diary, 10/1/67-12/31/67, Box 13, and WHCF, The
President's Appointment File [Diary Backup], 10/10/67-10/19/67, Box 79, LBJ Library.
404. As early as 1962, John Lewis noticed the beginning of a breakdown in "unity and
mutual respect" among workers in SNCC's activities. LEWIS & D'ORSO, supra note 4, at
193. Lewis believed the signing of the Voting Rights Act heralded "the last act for the
movement as I knew it." Id. at 361. Thereafter, the [Black Power] movement took over
SNCC and separatism and violence were the order of the day. Id. at 368-69. CORE had
ousted most of its white members by mid-1965, citing the need to appeal to local Black
communities. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 4, at 382-86. The exclusion of whites was
made official policy in 1968. Id. at 420. The media, used to dealing with a few leaders of
major civil rights organizations, kept looking for those who could explain what was happen-
ing. Vernon Jordan mentioned efforts of the media to anoint him as the Black "leader" when
he was named to succeed Whitney Young at the National Urban League. JORDAN &
GORDON-REED supra note 57, at 230-31.
405. "Black Power" had become the slogan for both SNCC and CORE by the summer of
1966. MEIER & RUDWICK, supra note 4, at 412-14. However, both organizations ultimately
were replaced by other, more locally-based, groups. Id. at 425. In July 1967 President John-
son appointed an Advisory Commission to investigate and report on the causes of racial
disorders in cities across the country. Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders 19 (1968). The Commission's extensive report (407 pages) revealed a trend toward
increased violence from 1963 through 1967, with the worst riots occurring in Newark and
Detroit. See generally, id. at 19-61.
406. CALIFANO, supra note 312, at 210-11 (commenting "[t]he nation was at flash point
with pent-up frustration and anger, and these leaders seemed bewildered by the rush of
events").
407. THE J01NSON YEARS, VOLUME THREE, LBJ AT HOME AND ABROAD, supra note 354,
at 104 (noting "[a]mid a turbulent racial revolution, [Johnson] steadfastly attempted to direct
social change along conventional lines, and the black leaders most closely associated with
him did little to shift him off course. No more than he did they control the new outrage and
militancy that fueled the ghetto upheavals and the movement toward black nationalism").
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people who did not accept that belief. While Branton's outgoing personality
allowed him to get along with just about anyone, Branton, too, soon would
have his own difficulties with this new militancy.
408
VI. CONCLUSION
When Wiley Branton left government service and relinquished his fo-
cus on voting rights in late 1967, he ended his role in a twenty-year continu-
ing effort that had achieved momentous change. From 1948, when Branton
first became involved in voter registration efforts, to the end of 1967, the
number of Black voters increased from five percent of those eligible to over
fifty percent in the South alone.40 9 These new votes changed the look of
government, especially at the local level. The number of elected Black offi-
cials in the South increased after passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act,
from fewer than 100 to 385 following the 1968 elections. 410 Although it was
now clear that voting rights alone were not enough to change circumstances
for thousands of Black Americans, Branton could, and did, feel proud of his
part in the accomplishment.
Branton himself had moved from a small town law practice limited to
African-American clients to positions where his advice was valued by the
President and Vice President of the United States. He had impressed Roy
Wilkins, longtime executive director of the NAACP and "Dean" of the civil
rights movement, who believed that Branton was the person to follow him
in guiding that organization. Wiley Branton would spend another four
years working with social action entities to improve the lives and bargaining
power of the poor412 before returning to the private practice of law in Wash-
408. During his term with the anti-poverty program, United Planning Organization, Bran-
ton would make efforts to reorganize the program. Betty James, Neighborhood Services Plan
To Direct Poverty Centers, WASH. STAR, JAN. 19, 1968, at B4. His plans included centraliz-
ing operations, which some employees viewed as antithetical to the goal of neighborhood
control. See Resignation Letters from Joan Cole to Wiley Branton (Apr. 22, 1968), and from
Patricia Saltonstall, to Hal Witt (May 9, 1968) (on file with author). The internal tensions led
to a work stoppage and acrimonious confrontations. Id.
409. WATTERS & CLEGHORN, supra note 139, at 245-47.
410. Press Release, Voter Education Project, Inc. (Feb. 16, 1972) (on file with author).
The number of Black elected officials had increased to 873 by 1972. Id.
411. Letter from Roy Wilkins, to Wiley Austin Branton (July 14, 1975) (on file with
author).
412. Branton remained with the UPO until June 14, 1969. Letter from Wiley Austin
Branton, to Frederick B. Lee, President, Board of Trustees, United Planning Organization
(May 12, 1969) (on file with author). He then joined forces with labor leader Walter B.
Reuther in July 1969 when he was appointed Executive Director of the Committee on Com-
munity and Social Action of the Alliance for Labor Action. Branton Joins New Labor Alli-
ance, WASH. POST, July 15, 1969, at C3. He was with the organization, where he worked
with community action groups, until August 14, 1971, when his two-year commitment to
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ington, D.C. in 1971.413 In 1977 Branton was chosen as Dean of the Howard
University School of Law.414 In September 1982 he left that position to join
the firm of Sidley & Austin (now Sidley Austin Brown & Wood) where he
became a partner in 1985.41 His achievements have not been forgotten.
Sidley Austin Brown & Wood honored his memory with a yearly luncheon
and scholarships at Howard University School of Law until 2004. In 2004
the event will become an annual symposium. A lecture is named in his
honor at the National Bar Association's annual conferences. Scholarships in
Branton's name are awarded at his college alma mater, the University of
Arkansas at Pine Bluff (formerly Arkansas A. M. & N.). Wiley Austin
Branton died in 1988 at the age of 65, having devoted most of his life in
service to the public.
Reuther ended. Memorandum from Wiley Austin Branton to All ALA Community Unions
and Participating Social Action Programs (Aug. 2, 1971) (on file with author).
413. Letter from Wiley Austin Branton, to West Publishing Company (Feb. 17, 1972) (on
file with author) (noting formal name change of new firm).
414. Letter from James E. Cheek, President, Howard University, to Wiley Austin Bran-
ton (Nov. 30, 1977) (on file with author).
415. The Profession; On the Move, supra note 46, at 3.
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